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A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The position of the minority shareholder is not an enviable one due to the 
fact that his rights and interests are at the disposal of the majority.1 This 
general principle is set out in the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, 2 which has proved 
a formidable obstacle to relief. It elaborates that only the company can bring 
proceedings for wrongs done to the company.3 The company is a legal 
person distinct from its shareholders. It follows that a wrong to the company 
is a not a wrong to each shareholder.4
The company, it is argued, cannot function efficiently as a group unless 
the will of the majority generally prevails.
  
5 Minority shareholders would be 
held to have minimal rights if these concepts were ruthlessly applied6 and 
could leave the oppressed with no option but to sell his shares.7
The minority shareholder will however be allowed to sue if he can 
convince the court that his case falls under the exceptions to the rule in Foss 
v. Harbottle.
  
8 A minority shareholder can only sue if the wrong is, or 
involves, the breach of some personal right and where the simple majority is 
not in a position to regularise or to do regularly what has been done 
irregularly.9
Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or 
in the interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, 
  
                                                          
1Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) 163; L.M. Schaef ‘The Oppression Remedy 
for Minority Shareholders’ (1985) 23 Alberta Law Review 512 at 512.  
2[1843] 2 Hare 461. 
3 Robin Hollington  Shareholders’ Rights  4ed (2004) 93; Salomon v. Salomon & Co Ltd [1987] AC 
22. 
4Robin Hollington  Shareholders’ Rights  4ed (2004) 6; Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of 
Shareholders (1989) 165. 
5Robin Hollington  Minority Shareholders’ Rights  2ed (1994) 1; Samuel & Others v. President 
Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1963 (3) SA 629 (A); D Davis et al Companies and other Business 
Structures in South Africa (2009) 68. 
6Robin Hollington  Minority Shareholders’ Rights 2ed (1994) 1. 
7L.M. Schaef ‘The Oppression Remedy for Minority Shareholders’ (1985) 23 Alberta Law 
Review 512 at 512. 
8[1843] 2 Hare 461; Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) 164. 
9Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) 166. 
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and should have effective means of redress.10 Restraints must therefore be 
put in place to protect against the dangers of majority rule to the detriment 
of the minority shareholder and the interests of the company as a whole. Key 
to protecting minority shareholders is the right to full disclosure and a 
clearly articulated duty of loyalty by board members to the companies and 
to all shareholders.11
Common provisions to protect minority shareholders, which have 
proven effective, include pre-emptive rights in relation to share issues, 
qualified majorities for certain shareholder decisions and the possibility to 
use cumulative voting in electing members of the board. Other means of 
improving minority shareholder rights are derivative and class action law 
suits.
 
12
 
 
B. Approach to the Topic 
1. The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 
The new Companies Act was signed by the President of South Africa on the 
8th of April 2009 and gazetted in gazette No 32121 (Notice 421). It comes into 
operation on a date still to be fixed by the President by proclamation in the 
gazette, which may not be earlier than one year following the date on which 
the President assented to this act.13
This thesis will examine the protection of the minority shareholder 
under the new Companies Act of 2008. It will begin by examining the 
 
                                                          
10OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) Part One III A (2) Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th June 2009]. 
11OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) Part Two III A (2) Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th June 2009]. 
12OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) Part Two III A (2) Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th June 2009]. 
13Available at http://www.acts.co.za/companies_act_2008/whnjs.htm [Accessed on 15 
August 2009]. 
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common law position as encapsulated in the rule of Foss v Harbottle14
The thesis will then make a comparison of minority shareholder 
protection under the United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 against that 
offered by the new Companies Act No 71 of 2008. Finally the thesis will look 
at the recommendations for minority shareholder protection under the King 
Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (2002) and the OECD 
principles of corporate governance and identify how far the new Companies 
Act No 71 of 2008 has incorporated them.    
 and the 
exceptions to the rule thereto. It will then examine the current provisions for 
minority shareholder protection under the old Companies Act No. 61of 1971 
in comparison to those under the new Companies Act No 71 of 2008. It will 
seek to determine whether the new Companies Act improves the position of 
the minority shareholder.  
It will finally conclude with an examination of the level of protection 
offered to the minority shareholder under the new Companies Act No 71 of 
2008 compared to the old Companies Act No 61 of 1973, the United 
Kingdom Companies Act of 2006, the King Report and the OECD principles 
of corporate governance with recommendations as to ways in which the act 
could be improved to enhance minority shareholder protection and thus 
encourage better corporate governance.  
                                                          
14[1843] 2 Hare 461. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
A. THE RULE IN FOSS V HARBOTTLE 
1. Introduction 
It is an elementary principle of law relating to joint stock companies that the 
court will not interfere with the internal management of companies acting 
within their powers, and in face has no jurisdiction to do so. Again it is clear 
law that in order to redress a wrong done to the company, or to recover 
money or damages alleged to be due to the company, the action should 
prima facie be brought by the company itself.15 These cardinal principles were 
laid down in the well known cases of Foss v Harbottle16 and Mozley v Alston17 
and are compositely referred to as “the Rule in Foss v Harbottle”.18
The reasons provided for the existence of the rules in Foss v Harbottle 
are that the principle avoids double jeopardy. In McLelland v Hulett and 
Others, 
  
19the court held that the real reason why the rule exists is linked to 
the separate existence of the company.  The court indicated that if the 
shareholder is allowed to sue it will result in a multiplicity of actions, 
‘double jeopardy’, against the wrongdoer for the same wrong.20
                                                          
15As per Lord Davey in Burland v. Earle [1902] A.C. 83 at 93 (P.C). 
  
16[1843] 2 Hare 461. 
17[1847] 1 Ph. 790. 
18K. W Wederburn ‘Shareholders Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) 15 (2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 194 at 195. 
191992 (1) SA 456 (D), D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa 
(2009) 188; JT Pretorius et al Hahlo’s South African Company law through the cases 6ed (1999) 
381;  MacDougall v. Gardiner (1875) 1 ChD 12; Goodall v. Hoogendoorn Ltd 1926 AD 11 at 16. 
201992 (1) SA 456 (D); D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa by 
(2009) 188; JT Pretorius et al Hahlo’s South African Company law through the cases 6 ed (1999) 
381; MacDougall v. Gardiner (1875) 1 ChD 12; Goodall v. Hoogendoorn Ltd 1926 AD 11 at 16; 
Mozley v. Alston [1847] 1 Ph. 799; Lord v. Copper Miners Co (1848)2 Ph. 740 at 752;  L Griggs 
‘The statutory derivative action: lessons that may be learnt from the past!’ University of 
Western Sydney Law review [2002] 4 par 1.2.  
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It would serve no purpose to allow a shareholder to litigate on a matter 
that could be legally ratified by the majority of shareholders.21 Allowing 
such an action will result in a return of corporate assets to shareholders 
without first paying the creditors of the company.22
 
 
2. The two parts of the rule and their point of contact 
The corporation principle states that the proper plaintiff in an action in 
respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a company or association of persons 
is prima facie the company or association of persons itself.23 This principle 
springs naturally from the treatment in law of the corporation as a person 
separate from the members of whom it is composed. Individual members of 
a corporation are quite distinct from the metaphysical body called the 
corporation.24 Thus, injuries allegedly caused to the corporation, not only by 
outsiders, but also by its own directors where their duties are owed to the 
corporation alone not its members, must be remedied not by the members 
but by corporate action.25
The second principle springs from a partnership doctrine which was 
already marcescent at the time when it was taken over.
   
26
                                                          
21JT Pretorius et al Hahlo’s South African Company law through the cases 6 ed (1999) 381. 
 In the early years of 
the nineteenth century the courts of equity were averse to interfering at all 
between one partner and another, unless it was for the purposes of 
dissolving the partnership, it being no duty of the courts to settle all 
22JT Pretorius et al Hahlo’s South African Company law through the cases 6 ed (1999) 381; Lindi 
Coetzee ‘Comparative Analysis of the Derivative Litigation Proceedings under the 1973 Act 
and the New Companies Act’ (2009) Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished 
Journal Article 5. 
23Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 AII E.R 1064,at 1066. 
24Salomon v. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22(HL); Bligh v. Brent [1837] 2Y & C. Ex 268 at 295; 
Soc of Practical Knowledge v. Abbott [1840] 2 Beav 559; Coach v. Goodman (1842) 2 Q.B. 580.  
25Foss v. Harbottle [1843] 2 Hare 461; Burland v. Earle [1902] A.C. 83 at 93 (P.C);  Dominion 
Cotton Mills co Ltd .v Amyot [1912] A.C. 546. 
26K. W Wederburn ‘Shareholders Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) 15 (2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 194 at 196. 
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partnership squabbles.27 This rule was extended to companies to ensure that 
courts of equity would not interfere between members of the company for 
the purpose of enforcing duties arising out of matters which are properly the 
subject of internal regulation.28 This was the unsatisfactory origin of Lord 
Davey’s proposition to the effect that the court has no jurisdiction on matters 
of internal management.29  Once established, however, the principles were 
rigorously applied to the many irregularities committed by those managing 
joint stock companies. Individual members could not complain of calls made 
within the directors’ powers but allegedly unfairly made; of an irregular 
quorum at a directors meeting or of alleged improprieties in the conduct of 
meetings, which were considered matters of internal regulation and under 
the control of the majority.30 The law had long recognised majority rule as a 
fundamental principle concerning corporations, 31 so there was no problem 
in expressing majority rule as the justification for refusal to interfere in 
internal management.32 The majority which decided disputes about internal 
management was also the traditional authority for deciding whether or not 
the corporation should bring an action in order to remedy a wrong 
committed against it.33
 
 
3. Exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle 
The rule in Foss v. Harbottle is however, not without its exceptions. 
 
                                                          
27Lindley Law of Partnerships 1 ed(1860) 2 752-753. 
28Lindley Law of Partnerships 11ed (1950) 573. 
29K. W Wederburn ‘Shareholders Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) 15 (2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 194 at 197. 
30K. W Wederburn ‘Shareholders Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) 15 (2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 194 at 197. 
31R v Varlo (1775) 1 Cowp 248 at 250, Attorney General v Davy (1741) 2 Atk 212. 
32K. W Wederburn ‘Shareholders Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) 15 (2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 194 at 198. 
33K. W Wederburn ‘Shareholders Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) 15 (2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 194 at 198. 
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a. Ultra vires 
A simple majority of members cannot ratify an act by the company which is 
illegal or ultra vires. It is plain that the majority can sue in this case because 
the majority cannot ratify an act ultra vires the company; and a fortiori the 
same reasoning will be applied to acts which are not merely outside the 
powers of one company, 34 but illegal in the sense of impossible for any 
registered company, or prohibited under general law.35
b. Special majorities 
 
The second is the special majorities exception that states, where the matter is 
one “which could validly be done or sanctioned not by a simple majority but 
by a simple majority of the members…but only by some special majority,” 
the rule is ousted.36
c. Personal rights 
  
The third is the personal rights exception that, “where the personal and 
individual rights of membership of (the plaintiff) have been invaded,” the 
rule has no application at all.37
d. Fraud by those in control 
 
The final exception is fraud by those in control. Where what has been done 
amounts to what is generally called a fraud on the minority and the wrong 
doers are themselves in control of the company, the rule is relaxed in favour 
of the aggrieved minority who are allowed to bring a minority shareholders’ 
action on behalf of themselves and all others, because, otherwise, the wrong 
                                                          
34Hope v. International Financial Soc. [1876] 4 Ch.D 327 (Purchase of company’s own shares); 
Ooregum Gold Mining Co v. Roper [1892] A.C. 125 (Shares at a discount). 
35Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co [1897] 2 Q.B. 242. 
36Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 AII E.R 1064 at 1067; Quin and Axtens Ltd v. Salmon [1909] 1 Ch. 
31; K. W Wederburn ‘Shareholders Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) 15 (2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 194 at 207. 
37Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 AII E.R 1064; K. W Wederburn ‘Shareholders Rights and the 
Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) 15 (2) Cambridge Law Journal 194 at 209; Peter G. Xuereb The 
Rights of Shareholders (1989) 166; Robin Hollington  Shareholders’ Rights 4ed (2004) 125. 
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doers themselves being in control, would not allow the company to sue.38 
The only possible from of action here is a derivative action because the 
wrong against which relief is sought is always a wrong to the company. The 
action is brought by a shareholder formally on behalf of himself and all other 
shareholders except the alleged wrongdoers and is brought against the latter 
and the company39 The essence of this exception, as viewed traditionally, is 
that the wrong is of a type which the company may not ratify and that the 
wrongdoers are in control of the powers of corporate litigation.40
 
The 
requirements are those of wrongdoer control and fraud on the majority.  
(i) Wrongdoer Control 
Control usually means majority voting control.41 This can be personal 
ownership of shares carrying voting rights or indirect through voting shares 
held by nominees.42 It also applies where the directors whom it is sought to 
sue can influence the vote by casting votes attached to shares held by 
another company on whose board they sit.43 The shareholder must be able to 
show that the company will be prevented from suing and must therefore 
have attempted to mobilise the appropriate company organ in which the 
power of decision has been vested.44 If there are any doubts as to the ability 
of the wrongdoer to control litigation through control of the majority of the 
votes in the general meeting, the court will direct the holding of a general 
meeting to decide the issue and the burden will fall on the Plaintiff to show 
that control was exercised.45
                                                          
38Burland v. Earle [1902] A.C. 83 at 93; Dominion Cotton Mills Co Ltd v. Amyot [1912] A.C. 546; 
A.J. Boyle Minority Shareholders’ Remedies (2002) 25; K. W Wederburn ‘Shareholders Rights 
and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ (1957) 15 (2) Cambridge Law Journal 194 at 203. 
  
39Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) 169. 
40Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) 169. 
41Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) 169. 
42Pavlides v. Jensen [1965] Ch 565. 
43Pavlides v. Jensen [1965] Ch 565. 
44Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) 169. 
45Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2) [1982] Ch 204 at 222, CA. 
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(ii) Fraud on the Majority 
Fraud in this context includes more than fraud at common law. It also covers 
fraud in the equitable sense of the term, as in the equitable concept of fraud 
on a power, an abuse or misuse of power.46 In the case of Prudential 
Assurance Co. Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2),47
Applying the traditional ‘non-ratifiability’ criterion, some wrongs 
appear to be ‘non-ratifiable’ (and therefore are ‘frauds’) while others are not. 
The question is where to draw the line.
 the Court of Appeal 
affirmed that ‘Whatever may be the properly defined boundaries of the 
exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, the plaintiff ought at least to be 
required to establish a prima facie case that the company is entitled to the 
relief claimed and that the action falls within the proper boundaries of the 
exception.’ This means that in a preliminary motion to strike out the action 
on the basis of Foss v. Harbottle, a prima facie case must be made out as to 
fraud and control.  
48 Ratification has been explained as 
the process by which “those to whom duties are owed may release those 
who owe the duties from their legal obligations prospectively of 
retrospectively.”49
 
 The generally accepted position, as approached on the 
traditional ratifiability analysis is as follows: 
(aa)  Non- ratifiable  
Misappropriation of corporate assets and mala fide exercise of power. 
                                                          
46Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v. GLC [1982] 1 All ER 437 at 445. 
47[1982] Ch 204. 
48Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) 171. 
49Jennifer Payne ‘A Re-Examination of Ratification’ 1999 58(3) Cambridge Law Journal 604 at 
605. 
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In Cook v. Deeks,50 the directors diverted a contract, which the company was 
actively perusing, to themselves and then purported as majority 
shareholders to ratify their conduct by a resolution declaring that the 
company had no interest in the contract. It was held that the majority could 
not be allowed to ratify their own breach of duty and that a derivative action 
lay.51 The case of Meiner v. Hooper’s Telegraph Works52 established that this 
type of fraud also extends to the abuse of power by the majority in a general 
meeting. In this case a derivative action lay where the majority compromised 
an action in which the company was involved, in return for the grant by the 
other party of a cable-laying contract to themselves in another guise. This 
approach was also followed in the Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v. GLC case53 
where Majoriry J held, that a majority resolution ordering the board to 
discontinue an action brought by the company against the majority, 
amounted to just such a fraud on a power as constituted a fraud on the 
majority.54
 
    
Self-serving negligence 
In Daniels v Daniels,55
“In Pavides v. Jensen,
 the directors sold a corporate asset to one of their 
number for 4,250 pounds. Four years later he sold it for 120,000 pounds. 
Lord Templeman said:  
56
                                                          
50[1916] AC 554. 
 it was alleged that directors had been guilty of 
gross negligence in selling a valuable asset of the company at a price greatly 
below its true market value. Danckerwerts J struck out the statement of 
claim as disclosing no cause of action because no fraud was pleaded. The 
authorities which deal with simple fraud on one hand and gross negligence 
51Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) 172. 
52(1874) 9 Ch App 350. 
53[1982] 1 All ER 437.  
54Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) 172. 
55[1978] Ch 406. 
56[1957] Ch 565. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
11 
 
on the other do not cover the situation which arises where, without fraud, 
the directors and majority shareholders are guilty of breach of duty which 
not only harms the company but benefits the directors. If minority 
shareholders can sue if there is a fraud, there is no reason why they cannot 
sue where the action of the majority and the directors, though not fraud, 
confer some benefit on those directors and majority shareholders 
themselves. To put up with foolish directors is one thing but to put up with 
directors who are so foolish that they make a profit of 115,000 pounds at the 
expense of the company is something entirely different.”57
The principle which may be gleaned is that a minority shareholder 
who has no other remedy may sue where directors use their powers 
intentionally or unintentionally, fraudulently or negligently in a manner 
which benefits themselves at the expense of the company.
 
58
 
  
(bb)  Ratifiable (albeit by the votes of the wrong doers) 
Mere negligence is ratifiable.59 A bona fide exercise of power for collateral 
purpose appears to be ratifiable.60  The making of an incidental secret profit 
out of one’s position as a director in the absence of mala fides is ratifiable.61
                                                          
57Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) 172. 
  
58Peter G. Xuereb The Rights of Shareholders (1989) 172. 
59Pavides v. Jensen [1957] Ch 565. 
60Bamford v. Bamford [1970] Ch 212; Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254. 
61Regal Hastings Ltd v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134n. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
STATUTORY REMEDIES FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
A. THE DERIVATIVE ACTION 
1. Introduction 
The derivative action refers to wrongs done to the company.62 The origins of 
the derivative action can be found in abuses of management occurring in 
associations and corporations. The courts were required to develop a process 
that would allow a shareholder or a member of the corporation or 
association to complain about malfeasance by the controllers of the entity. If 
the courts had not developed this process, the matter would then have gone 
without remedy, leaving the controllers with a free hand to divert the assets 
of the corporation to their own use.63
 It is described as a unique remedy because it allows a person to bring 
an action that belongs to the company
  
64. If the company cannot or will not 
act against those who wronged it, a derivative action on behalf of the 
company may be instituted in certain circumstances. Such an action will 
have to be instituted against the wrongdoers by somebody acting on his own 
behalf and all the shareholders other than the wrongdoers.65
                                                          
62Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 302. 
 The company, 
being unable to act as plaintiff, must be joined as a nominal defendant so it is 
party to the proceedings and an order can be made applicable to it. It is 
generally accepted that a derivative action may be instituted if an 
unratifiable wrong has been done to the company and where the company 
63L Griggs ‘The statutory derivative action: lessons that may be learnt from the past!’ 
University of Western Sydney Law review [2002] 5 part 2. 
64L Griggs ‘The statutory derivative action: lessons that may be learnt from the past!’ 
University of Western Sydney Law review [2002] 4 par 1.1.; D Davis et al Companies and other 
Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 187.   
65Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 303. 
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cannot or will not institute the action because the wrong doers control the 
company.66
 
  
2. Distinction between a personal claim and derivative claim 
The derivative action must be distinguished from the personal action. A 
member would have the right to institute the personal action where the 
member’s rights in terms of the contract created between the company and 
its members by virtue of the provisions of the memorandum and articles of 
association67 have been infringed.68 In the case of Goldex Mines v Revill69 
there was a fight for control of Probes Mines Ltd. At issue was alleged 
misconduct by the directors and defendant shareholders, including 
misleading proxy solicitation. However, it was not clearly stated whether the 
claim was personal or derivative and leave to bring an action had not been 
sought. The central issue was whether leave was acquired.  The Ontario 
Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that the endorsement was deficient as 
it failed to differentiate between personal claims and derivative claims. The 
case is authority for the proposition that, while derivative and personal 
actions may be joined in the one writ, it is necessary to distinguish each 
cause of action in the statement of claim.70
 The biggest difference between the derivative action and the personal 
action is that any damages awarded in a successful personal action will 
  
                                                          
66Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 303. 
67Section 65(2) Companies Act 61 of 1973; Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed 
(2000) 300.  
68Lindi Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act 
and the new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished 
Journal Article 5. 
69[1973] 32 DLR (3d) 129 (Ont HC). 
70L Griggs ‘The statutory derivative action: lessons that may be learnt from the past!’ 
University of Western Sydney Law review [2002] 11 part 3. 
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accrue to the shareholder personally whereas any damages awarded in a 
derivative action will accrue to the company.71
 
  
3. Derivative Action in South Africa 
Common law derivative action in South Africa has received little attention 
and the procedure to be followed in such an action is unclear.72 Common 
law derivative action is negatively affected by the serious defect that a 
member has to conduct the case at personal risk, especially with respect to 
cost.73 On one hand, should he be successful, the benefits accrue to the 
company. While on the other hand should he fail he will be liable for all 
costs.74 The plaintiff must also join action, while all information regarding 
company matters is in the hands of the controllers, who are usually the 
wrongdoers or sympathisers.75 It was also unclear as to precisely what 
conduct could not be ratified by simple majority hence the scope of the 
remedy was unclear.76
 The problems attached to the common law derivative action and the 
virtual disguise into which it had fallen in South Africa led to the creation of 
the Van Wyk de Vries Commission, which proposed the introduction of 
section 266
  
77 which provided for statutory derivative action.78
                                                          
71Lindi Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act 
and the new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished 
Journal Article 5. 
 According to 
Blackman the purpose of the statutory derivative action was to overcome the 
disadvantages of the common law derivative action.  The statutory 
72Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 303; Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v. 
Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2) [1980] 2 All ER 841 (Ch) 874-875.  
73D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 188.   
74Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 305. 
75Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 306; D Davis et al Companies and other 
Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 188. 
76D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 188. 
77Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
78Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 306; Van Wyk de Vries Commission 
Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Acts: Main Report (RP 45 of 1970) par 42.10-
42.18. 
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derivative action could satisfy the need to prevent frivolous and vexatious 
proceedings.79  This section seemed over to overlap with the common law 
derivative action to a large extent. Important differences however existed. 
They are that, the statutory derivative action is only available in respect of a 
delict or breach of trust or faith, while, no such limitation attaches to the 
common law action; and that in the case of the statutory derivative action 
the cause of action cannot be neutralised by any act of ratification or 
condonation on the part of the company while in the case of the common 
law action, such condonation or ratification could quite conceivably 
neutralise the cause of action.80
 In effect statutory derivative action applies even in respect of ratifiable 
wrongs, thereby obviating the necessity of distinguishing between wrongs 
which can be ratified and those which cannot be ratified.
  
81
 
  
4. Derivative Action under the old Companies Act No 61 of 1973 
In terms of section 266(1)82
                                                          
79Lindi Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act 
and the new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished 
Journal Article 5; Blackman in Joubert (ed) The law of South Africa vol 4 part 2 (1st reissue) par 
210 footnote 2, TWK Agriculture Ltd v NCT Forestry Co-Operative Ltd and Others 2006 (6) SA 20 
(N) par 15. 
 initiation of proceedings on behalf of company by 
a member may be instituted where a company has suffered damages or loss 
or has been deprived of any benefit as a result of any wrong, breach of trust 
or breach of faith committed by any director or officer of that company or by 
any past director or officer while he was a director or officer of that company 
and the company has not instituted proceedings for the recovery of such 
damages, loss or benefit. Any member of the company may initiate 
proceedings on behalf of the company against such director or officer or past 
director or officer in the manner prescribed by the section notwithstanding 
80Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 306. 
81Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 306. 
82Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
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that the company has in any way ratified or condoned any such wrong, 
breach of trust or breach of faith or any act or omission relating thereto.83
 Cilliers and Benade
 
84make general remarks about section 26685
(a) The section appears to cover only wrongs as a result of which the 
company has suffered damages or has been deprived of a benefit are 
covered by this section. Wrongs to members or minority shareholders are 
not included. 
 stating 
that:  
86
(b) Only certain types of wrongs are covered by section 266.
   
87 In respect of 
wrongs not covered by this section, shareholders should resort to the 
common law derivative action.88
(c) The action is only available where the company has not instituted 
proceedings. In this respect it is important to note that the proceedings can 
be initiated, notwithstanding the fact that the company has ratified or 
condoned the cause of action or any conduct or omission relating thereto.
 
89 
The institution of proceedings is in no way affected by the fact that the 
conduct can be ratified. If ratification has taken place the court may in terms 
of section 266(4)90 order that any resolution ratifying or condoning the 
wrong shall be of no force or effect if it deems it desirable to proceed against 
the wrongdoer.91
(d) The action is only available if damages or losses have been caused by a 
director or officer of that company or by any past director or officer while he 
  
                                                          
83S 266(1)Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
84Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 307. 
85Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
86Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 307. 
87Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 307; Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
88Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 307 footnote 46. 
89Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 307. 
90Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
91Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 307 footnote 47. 
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was a director or officer of that company.92 The statutory derivative action is 
not available in respect of wrongs committed by other persons and members 
will have to resort to the common law derivative action. It would appear 
that the statutory action would not even be available where the wrong 
committed was committed by directors and officers of other companies 
within the same group.93 A contradiction appears since section 37(3)(b)94, 
allows for statutory derivative action in particular circumstances in the case 
of loans and security in respect of directors and officers of a holding 
company.95
 
  
a. Procedure 
If the company has suffered damages or has been deprived of any benefit as 
a result of the wrong, breach of trust or breach of faith, a member of the 
company96 may initiate proceedings against the wrongdoer in the prescribed 
way.97
 Any such member shall serve a written notice on the company calling 
on the company to institute such proceedings within one month from the 
date of service of the notice and stating that if the company fails to do so, an 
application to the court will be made.
 
98
                                                          
92Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 307. 
If the company fails to institute such 
proceedings within the said period of one month, the member may make 
application to the court for an order appointing a curator ad litem for the 
company for the purpose of instituting and conducting proceedings on 
93This follows from the use of the words “of that company”. 
94Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
95Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 307 footnote 48.  
96Thurgwood v. Dick Kruger Traders (Pty) Ltd 1990 (2) SA 44 (E) 46; Cilliers et al Cilliers & 
Benade. Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 307 footnote 49. 
97Cilliers et al Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 307. 
98S 266(2)(a) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
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behalf of the company against such director or officer or past director or 
officer.99
 The court on such application, if it is satisfied that the company has not 
instituted such proceedings;
 
100 that there are prima facie grounds for such 
proceedings;101 and that an investigation into such grounds and into the 
desirability of the institution of such proceedings is justified, may appoint a 
provisional curator ad litem and direct him to conduct such investigation and 
to report to the court on the return day of the provisional order.102
 On the return day the court may discharge the provisional order or 
confirm the appointment of the curator ad litem for the company.
 
103  The 
court may issue directions regarding the institution of proceedings in the 
name of the company by the curator ad litem as the court thinks necessary.104  
The court may further order that any resolution ratifying or condoning the 
wrong, breach of trust or breach of faith shall be of no force and effect.105
 
  
(i) Powers of curator ad litem 
A provisional curator ad litem appointed by the court106 and a curator ad litem 
whose appointment is confirmed by the court107 shall, in addition to the 
powers expressly granted by the court in connection with the investigation, 
proceedings and enforcement of a judgment, have the same powers as an 
inspector under section 260,108
                                                          
99S 266(2)(b) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
 and the provisions of that section shall, apply 
mutatis mutandis to the provisional curator ad litem and to the curator ad litem 
100S 266(3)(a) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
101S 266(3)(b) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
102S 266(3)(c) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
103S 266(4) Companies Act No 61 of 1973 
104S 266(4) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
105S 266(4) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
106S 266(3) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
107S 266(3) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
108Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
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and to the directors, officers, employees, members and agents of the 
company concerned.109
 The provisional curator ad litem and the curator ad litem also have 
powers with regard to documents and evidence during the investigation. 
Any director, officer or agent of a company or other body corporate whose 
affairs are being investigated by an inspector, shall at the request of the 
curator ad litem produce to him all books and documents of or relating to the 
company or other body corporate, in his custody or under his control, and 
afford him such assistance within his power in connection with the 
investigation as the he may require.
 
110
 An curator ad litem may for the purpose of any investigation conducted 
by him summon any director, officer, employee, member or agent of the 
company or other body corporate to appear before him at a time and place 
specified in the summons, to be interrogated or to produce any book or 
document so specified;
 
111 administer an oath to or accept an affirmation 
from any person appearing before him in pursuance of a summons, and 
interrogate such person and require him to produce any such book or 
document;112 retain for examination any book or document produced to him 
in pursuance of a summons for a period not exceeding two months or for 
such further period or periods as the registrar may on good cause shown, 
permit.113
 A summons for the attendance of any person before the curator ad litem 
or for the production to him of any book or document may be in such form 
 
                                                          
109S 267(1) Companies Act No 61 of 1973; Subject to the provisions of S 267(2) Companies 
Act No 61 of 1973. 
110S 260(1) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
111S 260(2)(a) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
112S 260(2)(b) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
113S 260(2)(c) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
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as he may determine, shall be signed by him, and shall be served in the same 
manner as a subpoena in a criminal case issued by a magistrate's court.114
 Any person duly summoned to appear before an curator ad litem, who 
without sufficient cause fails to attend at the time and place specified in the 
summons or to remain in attendance until excused by the curator ad litem 
from further attendance;
 
115 or refuses upon being required to do so by the 
curator ad litem, to take an oath or to affirm as a witness or refuses or fails to 
produce any book or document which he has been required to produce or to 
answer fully and satisfactorily to the best of his knowledge and belief all 
questions put to him by the curator ad litem concerning the affairs of the 
company or other body corporate whose affairs are being investigated, 
whether or not the answer is likely to incriminate him, shall be guilty of an 
offence. 116  If the curator ad litem considers it necessary for the purposes of 
his investigation that a person whom he has no power to examine on oath 
should be so examined, he may apply to the court for an order calling upon 
such person to appear before it.117
 If the disclosure of any information about the affairs of a company to a 
provisional curator ad litem or a curator ad litem would in the opinion of the 
company be harmful to the interests of the company, the court may on an 
application for relief by that company, if it is satisfied that the said 
information is not relevant to the investigation, grant such relief.
 
118
 The court may, if it appears that there is reason to believe that the 
applicant in respect of an application under section 266 (2)
 
119
                                                          
114S 260(3) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
 will be unable 
to pay the costs of the respondent company if successful in its opposition, 
115S 260(4)(a) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
116S 260(4)(b) Companies Act No 61 of 1973; Provided that, the law relating to privilege does 
not apply. 
117S 260(5) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
118S 267(2) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
119Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
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require sufficient security to be given for those costs and costs of the 
provisional curator ad litem before a provisional order is made.120
 
 
5. Derivative action under the new Companies Act No 71 of 2008  
Section 165 starts by stating that any right at common law of a person other 
than a company to bring or prosecute any legal proceedings on behalf of that 
company is abolished and the rights in that section are in substitution for 
any such abolished right.121 While section 165 of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 abolishes any common law right of a person other than a company to 
bring or prosecute any legal proceedings on behalf of that company, section 
266 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 did not abolish the common law 
derivative action.  Where the wrong is not covered by section 266 the 
shareholder had to institute the common law derivative action against the 
wrongdoers.122 The abolishment of the common law in the Companies Act 
71 of 2008 will exclude the ‘fraud on the company’ cases.123
 Section 165
 
124 provides that the action may be used to protect the legal 
interests of the company.  The section does not specify the causes of action 
for which the derivative action can be used but provides a wide description 
that allows use of the action to protect legal interests.  The Act does not 
define the term legal interest and it could consequently be interpreted very 
widely.125
                                                          
120S 268 Companies Act No 61 of 1973.  
  Section 266 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was limited to 
instances of delict, breach of trust or breach of faith by a director or officer of 
121S 165(1) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
122Lindi Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act 
and the new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished 
Journal Article 13. 
123Company Law Seminar Manual by PA Delport (2008); Lindi Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of 
the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act and the new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished Journal Article 13. 
124Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
125Lindi Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act 
and the new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished 
Journal Article 13. 
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the company, whereas the provision in section 165 of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 is much wider.  The reason for the wider application it could be 
argued was to make provision for the type of cases that would have fallen 
outside the ambit of section 266 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 but still 
within the ambit of the common law derivative action.126
 
 
a. Persons who may institute proceedings 
A person may serve a demand upon a company to commence or continue 
legal proceedings, or take related steps, to protect the legal interests of the 
company if the person:127
(a)    is a shareholder or a person entitled to be registered as a shareholder, of 
the company or of a related company;
 
128
(b) is a director or prescribed officer of the company or of a related 
company;
 
129
(c)     is a registered trade union that represents employees of the company, 
or another representative of employees of the company;
 
130
(d) has been granted leave of the court to do so, which may be granted 
only if the court is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to do so to 
protect a legal right of that other person.
 or 
131
 This is different from the section 266(1) of Companies Act 61 of 1973 
which only allowed a member to initiate proceedings on behalf of the 
company. Section 165(2) the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides for wider 
 
                                                          
126Lindi Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act 
and the new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished 
Journal Article 13.  
127S 165(2) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
128S 165(2) (a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
129S 165(2) (b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
130S 165(2)(c) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
131S 165(2) (d) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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range of people to take related steps, to protect the legal interests of the 
company.  
 
b. Procedure 
A company that has been served with a demand in terms of section 165(2) 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 may apply within 15 business days to a court 
to set aside the demand, only on the grounds that it is frivolous, vexatious or 
without merit.132
 If the company does not make an application to set aside the demand 
or the court does not set aside the demand, the company must
 
133 appoint an 
independent and impartial person or committee to investigate the demand, 
and report to the board134 any facts or circumstances that may gave rise to a 
cause of action contemplated in the demand135 or that may relate to any 
proceedings contemplated in the demand.136 The independent and impartial 
person or committee must further report to the board the probable costs that 
would be incurred if the company pursued any such cause of action or 
continued any such proceedings137 and whether it appears to be in the best 
interests of the company to pursue any such cause of action or continue any 
such proceedings.138
 Within 60 business days after the company is served with the demand, 
or within a longer time as a court, on application by the company
  
139
                                                          
132S 165(3) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
, may 
allow, either initiate or continue legal proceedings, or take related legal steps 
to protect the legal interests of the company, as contemplated in the 
133S 165(4) Companies Act No 71 of 2008.  
134S 165(4)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
135S 165(4)(a)(i)(aa) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
136S 165(4)(a)(i)(bb) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
137S 165(4)(a)(ii)Companies Act No 71 of 2008.  
138S 165(4)(a)(iii)Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
139S 165(4)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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demand140 or serve a notice on the person who made the demand, refusing 
to comply with it.141
 A person who has made a demand may apply to a court for leave to 
bring or continue proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company
 
142
(a) has failed to apply to have the demand set aside or the company failed 
to appoint an independent and impartial person to investigate the matter or 
where the company failed to institute the legal proceedings or has not 
notified the person making the demand that it will not comply with the 
demand
.  
The court may grant leave only if the company: 
143
(b) where the company appointed an investigator or committee who was 
not independent and impartial
 or;  
144
(c) accepted a report that was inadequate in its preparation, or was 
irrational or unreasonable in its conclusions or recommendations
 or; 
145
(d) acted in a manner that was inconsistent with the reasonable report of 
an independent, impartial investigator or committee
 or;  
146
(e) has served a notice refusing to comply with the demand.
 or;  
147
 The court must be satisfied that the applicant is acting in good faith
   
148, 
the proposed or continuing proceedings involve the trial of a serious 
question of material consequence to the company149
                                                          
140S 165(4)(b)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008.  
 and it is in the best 
141S 165(4)(b)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008  
142S165(5) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
143S 165(5)(a)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
144S 165(5)(a)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
145S 165(5)(a)(iii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
146S 165(5)(a)(iv) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
147S 165(5)(a)(iv) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
148S 165(5)(b)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
149S 165(5)(b)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
wn
25 
 
interests of the company that the applicant be granted leave to commence 
the proposed proceedings or continue the proceedings.150
 In exceptional circumstances, a person
   
151 may apply to a court for leave 
to bring proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company without 
making a demand or without affording the company time to respond to the 
demand152 Such leave may only be granted if the court is satisfied that the 
delay may result in irreparable harm to the company153; where the delay 
may result in substantial prejudice to the interests of the applicant or another 
person154 and where there is a reasonable probability that the company may 
not act to prevent that harm or prejudice, or act to protect the company’s 
interests that the applicant seeks to protect. 155 The court must further be 
satisfied that the applicant is acting in good faith, the proposed or 
continuing proceedings involve the trial of a serious question of material 
consequence to the company and that it is in the best interests of the 
company that the applicant be granted leave to commence or continue the 
proposed proceedings156
 A rebuttable presumption that granting leave is not in the best interests 
of the company arises if it is established
.   
157 that the proposed or continuing 
proceedings are by the company against a third party158 or a third party 
against the company159 and that the company has decided not to bring the 
proceedings,160 nor defend them161
                                                          
150S 165(5)(b)(iii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008.  
 or to discontinue, settle or compromise 
151As contemplated in s165(2) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
152S 165(6) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
153Section 165(6)(a)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
154Section 165(6)(a)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
155Section 165(6)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
156Section 165(6)(c) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; S 165(5)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
157S 165(7) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
158S 165(7)(a)(i)Companies Act No 71 of 2008; As per s165(8) Companies Act No 71 of 2008 a 
person is a third party if the company and that person are not related or interrelated and 
proceedings by or against the company includes any appeal from a decision made in 
proceedings by or against the company. 
159S 165(7)(a)(ii)Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
160S 165(7)(b)(i)Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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the proceedings.162It is also a requirement that all of the directors who 
participated in this decision must have acted in good faith and for a proper 
purpose; 163must not have a personal financial interest in the decision, and 
were not related to a person who had a personal financial interest in the 
decision.164 The directors should have informed themselves about the subject 
matter of the decision to the extent they reasonably believed to be 
appropriate165 and reasonably believed that the decision was in the best 
interests of the company.166
 When the court grants leave
 
167 to a person it must also make an order 
stating who is liable for the remuneration and expenses of the person 
appointed168and may further vary the order at any time.169  Persons liable 
under the order, or the order as varied, are all or any of the parties to the 
proceedings or application170and the company itself.171If the order makes 
two or more persons liable, it may also determine the nature and extent of 
the liability of each of those persons172 and the person to whom leave has 
been granted is entitled, on giving reasonable notice to the company, to 
inspect any books of the company for any purpose connected with the legal 
proceedings.173
                                                                                                                                                                                    
161S 165(7)(b)(ii)Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 This is an improvement from the old act since it enables the 
shareholder to have access to information that will be necessary in the 
litigation process. However this access is not automatic and leave of the 
court is required.  
162S 165(7)(b)(iii)Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
163S 165(7)(c)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
164S 165(7)(c)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
165S 165(7)(c)(iii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
166S 165(7)(c)(iv) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
167S 165(9) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
168S 165(9)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
169S 165(9)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
170S 165(9)(c)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
171S 165(9)(c)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
172S 165(9)(d) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
173S 165(9)(e) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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 In the initial stages when approaching the court for permission to 
institute legal proceedings, the applicant has to rely on the provisions of the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act174 to obtain access to the required 
information.175 In Davis v Clutcho (Pty) Ltd176the fact that a shareholder had 
no right to information does not prevent an application for access to the 
company’s records in terms of the provisions of the Promotion of Access to 
Information.177  In order to obtain access to the required information the 
person will have to prove that the information is required for the exercise or 
protection of any rights178 and that without the information the person will 
be unable to exercise his right in terms of section 165.179   The applicant will 
also have to comply with the procedural requirements prescribed in the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act.180  To avoid the procedure of an 
application for access to information, the legislature could have considered 
adding a provision that entitles the applicant to the rights of discovery prior 
to the initiation of proceedings.181
 The court may at any time, make an order it considers appropriate 
about the costs 
 
182of the person who applied for or was granted leave, 183the 
company, 184or any other party to the proceedings or application.185 This 
order may require security for costs.186
                                                          
174Act No 2 of 2000. 
 A person may apply to a court for an 
175Lindi Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act 
and the new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished 
Journal Article 20. 
1762004 (1) SA 75 (C). 
177Iain Currie and Johan De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005) 698; Act No 2 of 2000. 
178S32(1)(b) Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
179Iain Currie and Johan De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005) 696-697. 
180S 32(1)(b) Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
181Arad Reisburg ‘Promoting the Use of Derivative Actions’ (2003) 24 (250) Company Lawyer 
Available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=502864 [Accessed on 13 August 2009]; Lindi 
Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act and the 
new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished Journal 
Article 20. 
182S 165(10) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
183S 165(10)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008.  
184S 165(10)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
185S 165(10)(c) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
186S 165(11) Companies Act No 71 of 2008.  
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order that they be substituted for the person to whom leave was originally 
granted, and the court may make the order applied for187 if it is satisfied that 
it is in good faith188 and appropriate under the circumstances.189  The 
substitution order has the effect that the grant of leave is taken to have been 
made in favour of the substituting person,190 and if the person originally 
granted leave has already brought the proceedings, the substituting person 
is taken to have brought those proceedings or to have made that 
intervention.191
 If the shareholders of a company have ratified or approved any 
particular conduct of the company it does not prevent a person from making 
a demand, applying for leave, or bringing or intervening in proceedings 
with leave of the court,
 
192 and further, does not prejudice the outcome of any 
application for leave, or proceedings brought or intervened in.193The court 
may take the ratification or approval into account in making any judgement 
or order.194 Proceedings brought or intervened in must not be discontinued, 
compromised or settled without the leave of the court.195
 The right of a person to serve a demand on a company, or apply to a 
court for leave, may be exercised by that person directly, or by the 
commission or panel, or another person on behalf of that first person.
 
196
 
  
                                                          
187S 165(12) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
188 S 165(12)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
189 S 165(12)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
190 S 165(13)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
191 S 165(13)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
192 S 165(14)(a)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
193 S 165(14)(a)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
194 S 165(14)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
195 S 165(15) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
196S 165(16) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; it must be done in a manner provided for in s 157 
of the  Companies Act No 71 of 2008, which provides that the commission or panel, acting 
on its own motion and in its absolute discretion may commence any proceedings in a court 
in the name of a person who made a written request to the commission or panel and may 
apply for leave to intervene in any court proceedings in order to represent any interest that 
would not otherwise be adequately represented in those proceedings. 
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6. Conclusion 
The key difference that arises is that, section 165 of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008, revokes the common law derivative action, while section 266 of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973, did not revoke common law. The next is that 
derivative action as provided for in section 266 of the Companies Act 61 of 
1973 was only available to members of the company whereas the provisions 
of section 165 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, extend the right to a broader 
category of persons. This has the effect of increasing access to justice to other 
people who may adversely affected by the actions of the wrongdoers in 
control.  
 Other differences are that under Section 266 of the Companies Act 61 of 
1973, the derivative action could only be instituted against a director or past 
director to recover damage suffered by the company as a result of wrongful 
acts, breach of faith and trust, while Section 165 of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008, entitles the person to initiate proceedings to protect the legal rights of 
the company.  The section does not specify the causes of action for which the 
derivative action is available and may be criticized as being too wide.197
 It is argued that one of the most difficult things to achieve in any 
litigation is to gather the facts.
 
Section 165 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, compels the company to notify 
the person if it refuses to comply with the demand whereas such 
responsibility does not exist in section 266 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.  
198
                                                          
197 Lindi Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act 
and the new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished 
Journal Article 23. 
 This can be critical in a derivative action as 
the relevant information is probably in the hands of the controllers of the 
company. These are the persons who would normally be the focus of the 
litigation. It may well be that the member needs to get access to the 
company's records in order to determine whether or not an action should be 
198Darryl D. McDonough ‘Proposed new statutory derivative action -does it go far enough? 
(1996)8(1) Bond Law Review Article 3 45 at 51. 
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instituted, but this is inaccessible to him.199 Rights of discovery prior to the 
initiation of litigation are therefore very important. Any amendments to the 
Act should therefore introduce measures to remedy this disadvantage.200
                                                          
199Darryl D. McDonough ‘Proposed new statutory derivative action -does it go far enough? 
(1996)8(1) Bond Law Review Article 3 45 at 51. 
 
200Arad Reisburg ‘Promoting the Use of Derivative Actions’ (2003) 24 (250) Company Lawyer 
Available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=502864 [Accessed on 13 August 2009]. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A. REMEDY FROM UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL OR OPPRESSIVE 
CONDUCT 
1. Introduction 
In the case of Ebraihimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd201
“The foundation of it all lies in the words “just and equitable”…the words 
are a recognition of the fact that a limited company is more than a mere legal 
entity, with a personality in law by its own: that there is room in company 
law for recognition of the fact that behind it, or amongst it, there are 
individuals with rights expectations and obligations inter se which are not 
submerged in the company structure.”
, Lord Wilberforce stated 
that: 
202
This was an example of the courts interpretation of the oppression 
remedy. In this case great faith is placed on the proposition that the interest 
of shareholders should not be trammelled by those in a position of 
advantage.
  
203
 
  
2. Oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct under the old Companies 
Act No 61 of 1973 
Section 252 of the Companies Act of 1973 was aimed at providing a statutory 
remedy to minority shareholders who were the victims of oppressive 
conduct by the majority in their control of the company.204
                                                          
201[1973] AC 360  
 In terms of 
Section 252 of the Companies Act of 1973 any member of a company who 
complains that any particular act or omission of a company is unfairly 
prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that the affairs of the company are being 
202Ebraihimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 at 379 
203L.M. Schaef ‘The Oppression Remedy for Minority  Shareholders’ (1985) 23 Alberta Law 
Review 512 at 512  
204D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 189. 
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conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or 
to some part of the members of the company, may make an application to 
the court for an order. 205
The act complained should relate to an alteration of the memorandum 
of the company;
 
206 a reduction of the capital of the company;207 a variation of 
rights in respect of shares of a company208 and conversion of a private 
company into a public company or of a public company into a private 
company.209 An application to the court shall be made within six weeks after 
the date of the passing of the relevant special resolution required in 
connection with the particular act concerned.210
 
 
a. Procedure 
If on application it appears to the court that the particular act or omission is 
unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that the company's affairs are 
being conducted as aforesaid and it considers it just and equitable, it may, 
with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of, make such 
order as it thinks fit, whether for regulating the future conduct of the 
company's affairs or for the purchase of the shares of any members of the 
company by other members thereof or by the company and in the case of a 
purchase by the company, for the reduction accordingly of the company's 
capital.211
                                                          
205S 252(1) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
 
206S 252(2)(a) Companies Act No 61 of 1973; Any alteration of the memorandum of the 
company under s 55 or 56 of the Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
207S 252(2)(b) Companies Act No 61 of 1973; Any reduction of the capital of the company 
under s 83 of the Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
208S 252(2)(c) Companies Act No 61 of 1973; Any variation of rights in respect of shares of a 
company under s 102 of the Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
209S 252(2)(d) Companies Act No 61 of 1973; A conversion under s 22 of the Companies Act 
No 61 of 1973. 
210S 252(2) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
211S 252(3) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
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Where the order makes any alteration or addition to the memorandum 
or articles of a company, the alteration or addition shall have effect as if it 
had been duly made by special resolution of the company212 and the 
company shall have no power, save as otherwise provided in the order, to 
make any alteration in or addition to its memorandum or articles which is 
inconsistent with the order except with the leave of the court.213 A copy of 
any order shall within one month after the making thereof, be lodged by the 
company in the form prescribed with the registrar for registration.214 Any 
company which fails to comply shall be guilty of an offence.215
 
 
3. Oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct under the new Companies 
Act No 71 of 2009 
Under Section 163 of the Companies Act No 71 of 2009 a shareholder or a 
director of a company may apply to a court for relief if any act or omission of 
the company, or a related person,216 has had a result that is oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of the 
applicant.217 Relief may also be sought if the business of the company, or a 
related person, is being or has been carried on or conducted in a manner that 
is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the 
interests of the applicant218
                                                          
212S 252(4)(a)Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
 or the powers of a director or prescribed officer 
of the company, or a person related to the company, are being or have been 
213S 252(4)(b)Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
214S 252(5)(a)Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
215S 252(5)(b)Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
216As per s 2(1) of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008, an individual is related to another 
individual if they are married, or live together in a relationship similar to a marriage or are 
separated by no more than two degrees of natural or adopted consanguinity or affinity. An 
individual is related to a juristic person if the individual directly or indirectly controls the 
juristic person and a juristic person is related to another juristic person if either of them 
directly or indirectly controls the other or the business of the other either is a subsidiary of 
the other, or a person directly or indirectly controls each of them, or the business of each of 
them. 
217S 163(1)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
218S 163(1)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that 
unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant.219
In section 252 of the Companies Act of 1973 the remedy was only 
available to members while section 163 of the Companies Act No 71 of 2009 
extends this remedy to apply to both members and directors. In section 163, 
the circumstances in which the remedy is available have been clearly and 
broadly defined.
 
220 It is clear that the remedy is available as the result of a 
single act or omission or as a result of a course of dealing.221The basis for 
oppressive conduct complained of, also extends to persons controlling the 
company as related persons. It is further clear that, the remedy is directed at 
relief for the aggrieved member or director and not the company itself.222 It 
extends the relief to powers of a director or prescribed officer of the 
company, or a person related to the company which are exercised in a 
manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the 
applicant. This ground is likely to be used particularly in the event of abuse 
of power by the managing director, an executive director or persons 
controlling the company, without it being necessary to show that the 
director’s act constituted an act of the company.223 The court appears to have 
less restricted discretion in that, the court could only intervene under section 
252(2) of the Companies Act of 1973 if one of the grounds was established, 
and it was just and equitable to do so. Under section 163 of the Companies 
Act No 71 of 2009, the court may make an order if one of the grounds is 
proved without it being necessary to establish specifically that the latter 
factors are present, although in practice it is likely they will be.224
 
  
 
                                                          
219S 163(1)(c) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
220D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 190. 
221D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 190. 
222D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 190. 
223D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 190. 
224D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 190. 
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a. Procedure 
Upon considering an application in terms of section 163, the court may make 
any interim or final order it considers fit,225
(a)an order restraining the conduct complained of;
 including: 
226
(b) an order appointing a liquidator, if the company appears to be 
insolvent;
 
227
(c) an order placing the company under supervision and commencing 
business rescue proceedings;
 
228
(d) an order to regulate the company’s affairs by directing the company to 
amend its memorandum of incorporation or to create or amend a 
unanimous shareholder agreement;
  
229
(e) an order directing an issue or exchange of shares;
 
230
(f)  an order— 
 
(i) appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or 
any of the directors then   in office;231
(ii) declaring any person delinquent or under probation;
 or 
232
(g) an order directing the company or any other person to restore to a 
shareholder any part of the consideration that the shareholder paid for 
shares, or pay the equivalent value, with or without conditions;
 
233
                                                          
225S 163(2) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 
226S 163(2)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
227S 163(2)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
228S163(2)(c) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; In terms of Chapter 6, if the court is satisfied that 
the circumstances set out in s131(4)(a) of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008 apply. 
229S 163(2)(d) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
230S 163(2)(e) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
231S 163(2)(f)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
232S 163(2)(f)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; As contemplated in s 162 of the Companies 
Act No 71 of 2008. 
233S 163(2)(g) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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(h)  an order varying or setting aside a transaction or an agreement to 
which the company is a party and compensating the company or any other 
party to the transaction or agreement;234
(i) an order requiring the company, within a time specified by the court, to 
produce to the court or an interested person financial statements in a form 
required by this Act, or an accounting in any other form the court may 
determine;
 
235
(j) an order to pay compensation to an aggrieved person, subject to any 
other law entitling that person to compensation;
 
236
(k) an order directing rectification of the registers or other records of a 
company;
 
237
(l) an order for the trial of any issue as determined by the court.
 or 
238
This is a more comprehensive description of the type of relief which 
the court may give compared to the old act which simply stated that the 
court, with a view to bringing to an end the matters complained of, make 
such order as it thinks fit.
 
239 The grounds for court intervention will be easier 
to establish and the court will also be able to intervene more effectively to 
put an end to the conduct complained of and to regulate the company’s 
future conduct in a way to prevent a recurrence.240 Due to this wide range of 
relief, the applicant should carefully motivate the relief which the applicant 
regards as appropriate in the circumstances.241
If the order directs the amendment of the company’s memorandum of 
incorporation the directors must promptly file a notice of amendment to give 
  
                                                          
234S 163(2)(h) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
235S 163(2)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
236S 163(2)(j) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
237S 163(2)(k) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
238S 163(2)(l) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
239S 252(3) Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
240D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 191. 
241D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 191. 
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it effect,242 and no further amendment altering, limiting or negating the 
effect of the court order may be made to the memorandum of incorporation 
until ordered otherwise.243 Whenever the court, on application by an 
interested person, or in any proceedings in which a company is involved, 
finds that the incorporation of, or any act by or on behalf of, or any use of 
that company constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality 
of the company as a separate entity, the court may declare that the company 
is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of such rights, 
obligations or liabilities of the company, or of such member or shareholder 
thereof, or of such other person as specified in the declaration, and the court 
may give such further order or orders as it may deem fit in order to give 
effect to such declaration.244
 
 
b. Conclusion 
In the old act this remedy was only available to members of the company 
while the new act extends this remedy to apply to both members and 
directors. The circumstances in which the remedy is available have been 
clearly and broadly defined. It is clear that the remedy is available as the 
result of a single act or omission or as a result of a course of dealing 
including persons controlling the company. It extends the relief to powers of 
a director or prescribed officer of the company which are exercised in a 
manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the 
applicant.  
The court appears to have less restricted discretion in that, the court 
could only intervene under section 252(2) of the Companies Act of 1973 if 
one of the grounds was established, and it was just and equitable to do so. 
                                                          
242S 163(3)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; The notice must be in accordance with s16(4) of 
the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
243S 163(3)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
244S 163(4) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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Under section 163 of the Companies Act No 71 of 2009, the court may make 
an order if one of the grounds is proved. There is a more comprehensive 
description of the type of relief which the court may give compared to the 
old act which simply stated that the court, with a view to bringing to an end 
the matters complained of, make such order as it thinks fit. The grounds for 
court intervention will be easier to establish and the court will also be able to 
intervene more effectively. 
With a view to providing expedious relief, section 163(1) of the 
Companies Act No 71 of 2009, provides for the shareholder or director to 
approach the court by way of application. Where the application is opposed 
it can easily happen that there will be conflicting evidence on affidavit which 
the court cannot resolve without oral evidence. It is therefore logical that 
section 163(2)(k) of the Companies Act No 71 of 2009, expressly empowers 
the court to make an order for the trial of any issue as determined by the 
court, where it cannot be decided by way of application proceedings.245
                                                          
245D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 192. 
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B. DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS’ AND APPRAISAL RIGHTS 
REMEDY  
1. Introduction 
The appraisal remedy was developed as protection for the minority against 
oppression by the majority.246 It provides shareholders with the right to 
dissent from certain types of corporate transactions and obtain payment for 
their shares from the corporation.247 Dissenters typically are entitled to the 
value or the fair value of their shares prior to the transaction being dissented 
from, which amount is determined in a judicial proceeding after certain 
procedural formalities are complied with.248Even developed countries have 
trouble defining market value. It has been stated that the market value of 
property shall mean a price at which a seller who is fully informed about the 
value of the property and is not obliged to sell the property would be willing 
to sell, and at which a buyer who is fully informed about the value of the 
property and is not obliged to buy the property would be willing to buy.249
The purpose and value of appraisal has long been in dispute. On one 
hand it has been argued that the appraisal remedy is of little practical benefit 
to dissenting shareholders and costly to the firm;
 
250
                                                          
246Daniel R. Fischel ‘The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law’ (1983)8 American Bar 
Foundation Research Journal 875 at 877 Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/828331 
[Accessed on 21st August 2009].  
 while on the other hand, 
the appraisal remedy has been defended as both a device that protects 
minority shareholders who do not want to invest in a different enterprise 
247Barry M. Wertheimer ‘The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and how the Courts 
determine Fair Value’ (1998) 47 Duke Law Journal 613 at 614. 
248Barry M. Wertheimer ‘The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and how the Courts 
determine Fair Value’ (1998) 47 Duke Law Journal 613 at 614. 
249Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman ‘A self enforcing model of corporate law’ (1995-
1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 1911 at 1957 and 1958. 
250Bayless Manning ‘The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker’ 
(1962)72 The Yale Law Journal 223. 
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from the arbitrariness of having to sell their shares in the market and a 
device that provides a check on management.251
In the absence of an appraisal remedy, a shareholder opposed to a 
fundamental corporate change could nonetheless be forced, by majority 
approval of the other shareholders, to remain an investor in an enterprise 
that no longer resembled the original investment made by that shareholder; 
it provides liquidity to a shareholder and a way out of an involuntarily 
altered investment.
 
252
 
 
2. Dissenting Shareholders and Appraisal Rights under the old 
Companies Act No 61 of 1973 
Section 102(1) of the Companies Act of 1973, provides that in the case of a 
company of which the share capital is divided into different classes of 
shares, provision is made by the memorandum or articles for authorizing the 
variation of the rights attached to any class of shares of the company.253 The 
holder of a share of that class, being a person who did not consent to or vote 
in favour of the resolution for the variation, may apply to the court for an 
order under section 252 of the Companies Act of 1973, which could includes 
the purchase by a company of their shares. This provision had little success 
in reported cases; however, its existence discouraged abuse of power by 
controlling shareholders in the context of the variation of class rights.254
 
  
 
                                                          
251Melvin A. Eisenberg The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis (1976) 69-77; Daniel 
R. Fischel ‘The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law’(1983)8 American Bar Foundation 
Research Journal  875 at 876 Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/828331 [Accessed on 
21st August 2009]. 
252Barry M. Wertheimer ‘The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and how the Courts 
determine Fair Value’ (1998) 47 Duke Law Journal 613 at 615. 
253As per s 102(1) of the Companies Act of 1973, this is subject to the consent of any specified 
proportion of the holders of the issued shares of that class or the sanction of a resolution 
passed at a separate meeting of the holders of those shares. 
254D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 193. 
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3. Dissenting Shareholders and Appraisal Rights under the new 
Companies Act No 71 of 2009 
a. Introduction 
The Companies Act No 71 of 2009 introduces an independent remedy for 
dissenting shareholders unlike the Companies Act of 1973; 255it is referred to 
as the dissenting shareholders and appraisal rights remedy. Section 164(1)256 
states that these rights do not apply to circumstances relating to a 
transaction, agreement or offer pursuant to a business rescue plan that was 
approved by shareholders of a company.257 If the company has given notice 
to shareholders of a meeting to consider adopting a resolution, it must 
include a statement informing shareholders of their rights258 and at any time 
before a resolution is to be voted on; a dissenting shareholder may give the 
company a written notice objecting to the resolution.259
The resolution must be either to amend its memorandum of 
incorporation by altering the preferences, rights, limitations or other terms of 
any class of its shares in any manner materially adverse to the rights or 
interests of holders of that class of shares, as contemplated in section 37(8) 
Companies Act No 71 of 2008;
  
260 or entering into a transaction as 
contemplated in section 112, 113, or 114 Companies Act No 71 of 2008.261 It is 
argued that, it will be extremely difficult for the objectors to establish that 
the resolution altered their rights in a way which is materially adverse to 
their rights and interests.262 Section 164263 does not apply where the board is 
authorised to change class rights. This is in line with section 163,264
                                                          
255D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 193. 
 whose 
256Companies Act No 71 of 2009. 
257Approval as per section 152 of the Companies Act No 71 of 2009. 
258S 164(2) Companies Act No 71 of 2008.  
259S 164(3) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
260S 164(2)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
261S 164(2)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; Proposals to dispose of all or a greater part of 
assets or undertakings, for amalgamation or merger and for schemes of arrangement. 
262D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 193. 
263Companies Act No 71 of 2009. 
264Companies Act No 71 of 2009. 
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purpose is to protect the minority shareholders against certain actions of the 
majority shareholders rather that the actions of the directors.265
 
 
b. Procedure 
Within 10 business days after a company has adopted a resolution the 
company must send a notice that the resolution has been adopted to each 
shareholder266 who gave the company a written notice of objection,267 who 
has neither withdrawn it nor voted in support of the resolution.268A 
shareholder may demand that the company pay the shareholder the fair 
value for all of the shares of the company held by that person,269 if the 
shareholder sent the company a notice of objection270 and in the case of an 
amendment to the company’s memorandum of incorporation, holds shares 
of a class that is materially and adversely affected by the amendment.271
Payment of fair value may also be demanded where the company has 
adopted the resolution
  
272 and the shareholder voted against that 
resolution273 and has complied with all of the procedural requirements.274 A 
shareholder who satisfies these requirements may make a demand by 
delivering a written notice to the company275 within 20 business days after 
receiving a notice,276
                                                          
265D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 193. 
 and if the shareholder does not receive the notice, 
within 20 business days after learning that the resolution has been 
266S 164(4) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
267S 164(4)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
268S 164(4)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
269S 164(5) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
270S 164(5)(a)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; as per S 164(6) Companies Act No 71 of 2008, 
this requirement does not apply if the company failed to give notice of the meeting, or failed 
to include in that notice a statement of the shareholders rights. 
271S 164(5)(a)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
272S 164(5)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
273S 164(5)(c)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
274S 164(5)(c)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
275S 164(7) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
276S 164(7)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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adopted.277This delivered demand must state the shareholder’s name and 
address,278 the number and class of shares in respect of which the 
shareholder seeks payment,279 and a demand for payment of the fair value of 
those shares.280
Once a shareholder has made a demand, he has no further rights in 
respect of those shares, other than to be paid their fair value
 
281 unless, he 
withdraws that demand before the company makes an offer or allows an 
offer made to lapse;282 if the company fails to make an offer and the 
shareholder withdraws the demand283 or if the company revokes the 
adopted resolution that gave rise to the shareholder’s rights. If any of these 
happens, all of the shareholder’s rights in respect of the shares are reinstated 
without interruption.284
Within five business days after the later of: the day on which the action 
approved by the resolution is effective;
 
285 the last day for the receipt of 
demands;286 the day the company received a demand, it must send to each 
shareholder who has sent such a demand a written offer to pay an amount 
considered by the company’s directors to be the fair value of the relevant 
shares accompanied by a statement showing how that value was 
determined.287 Every offer made in respect of shares of the same class or 
series must be on the same terms288 and lapses if it has not been accepted 
within 30 business days after it was made.289
                                                          
277S 164(7)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 
278S 164(8)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
279S 164(8)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
280S 164(8)(c) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
281S 164(9) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
282 S 164(9)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; A lapse as contemplated in s 164(12)(b) of the 
Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
283S 164(9)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
284S 164(9)(c) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
285S 164(11)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
286S 164(11)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
287S 164(11)(c) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
288S 164(12)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
289S 164(12)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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If a shareholder accepts an offer made he must tender the relevant 
share certificates to the company or its transfer agent,290 or take the steps to 
direct the transfer of those shares to the company or the transfer agent, in the 
event of uncertificated shares.291 Within 10 business days of this compliance, 
the company must pay that shareholder the agreed amount.292 Once a 
demand is made, a shareholder may apply to a court to determine a fair 
value in respect of the shares.293 An order requiring the company to pay the 
fair value will be made if the company has failed to make an offer294 or made 
an offer that the shareholder considers to be inadequate and that offer has 
not lapsed.295
On an application to the court for fair value of shares, dissenting 
shareholders who have not accepted an offer from the company as at the 
date of the application must be joined as parties and are bound by the 
decision of the court.
 
296 The company must notify each affected dissenting 
shareholder of the date, place, and consequences of the application and of 
their right to participate in the court proceedings.297
In this capacity the court may determine whether any other person is a 
dissenting shareholder who should be joined as a party
 
298 and must 
determine a fair value in respect of the shares of all dissenting 
shareholders.299 In the exercise of its discretion the court may appoint one or 
more appraisers to assist it in determining the fair value of the shares300
                                                          
290S 164(13)(a)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 or 
291S 164(13)(a)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
292S 164(13)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
293S 164(14) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
294S 164(14)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
295S 164(14)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
296S 164(15)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
297S 164(15)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
298S 164(15)(c)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
299S 164(15)(c)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; This is subject to s 164(16) of the Companies 
Act No 71 of 2008 which states that the fair value in respect of any shares must be 
determined as at the date on which and time immediately before the company adopted the 
resolution that gave rise to a shareholder’s rights. 
300S 164(15)(c)(iii)(aa) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
45 
 
allow a reasonable rate of interest on the amount payable to each dissenting 
shareholder from the date the action approved by the resolution is effective 
until the date of payment.301It may make an appropriate order of costs, 
having regard to any offer made by the company and the final determination 
of the fair value by the court.302 Finally the court must make an order 
requiring the dissenting shareholders to either withdraw their respective 
demands, in which case the shareholder is reinstated to their full rights as a 
shareholder, or to comply with the requirements of accepting the offer.303 
The company is then obliged to pay the fair value in respect of their shares 
to each dissenting shareholder who accepts the offer.304
If there are reasonable grounds to believe that payment by the 
company of the fair value would result in the company being unable to pays 
its debts as they fall due and payable for the ensuing 12 months, it may 
apply to a court for an order varying the its obligations.
  
305 The court may 
then make an order that is just and equitable, having regard to the financial 
circumstances of the company306 and ensuring that persons to owed money 
are paid at the earliest possible date compatible with the company satisfying 
its other financial obligations.307If the resolution resulted in the 
amalgamation or merger with one or more other companies, such that the 
shares which are the subject of the demand has ceased to exist, the 
obligations of that company are obligations of the successor to that company 
resulting from the amalgamation or merger.308
This section concludes by stating that for greater certainty, the making 
of a demand, tendering of shares and payment by a company to a 
 
                                                          
301S 164(15)(c)(iii)(bb) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
302S 164(15)(c)(iv) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
303S 164(15)(c)(v)(aa) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
304S 164(15)(c)(v)(bb) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; This is subject to any conditions the 
court considers necessary to ensure that the company fulfils its obligations. 
305S 164(17)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
306S 164(17)(b)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
307S 164(17)(b)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
308S 164(17) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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shareholder does not constitute a distribution by the company nor an 
acquisition of its shares by the company within the meaning of section 48 
Companies Act No 71 of 2008,309 and therefore are not subject to its 
provisions310 nor the application of the solvency and liquidity test as set out 
in section 4 Companies Act No 71 of 2008.311
 
 
c. Conclusion 
The Companies Act No 71 of 2009 introduces an independent remedy for 
dissenting shareholders unlike the Companies Act of 1973 which is referred 
to as the dissenting shareholders and appraisal rights remedy. This seems to 
be in line with section 163,312
                                                          
309S 164(19) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 whose purpose is to protect the minority 
shareholders against the actions of the majority shareholders rather that the 
actions of the directors. The circumstances in which the remedy is available 
have also been clearly and broadly defined with detailed procedural 
requirements that seem to ensure that the dissenting shareholder’s shares 
are adequately appraised.  
310S 164(19)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
311S 164(19)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
312Companies Act No 71 of 2009. 
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C. APPLICATION TO DECLARE DIRECTOR DELINQUIENT OR 
UNDER PROBATION 
1. The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 
2. Introduction 
The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 introduces provisions that provide 
remedies against directors who have blatantly abused their positions. The 
court is empowered to disqualify these directors from serving as directors or 
place them under probation.313 Section 162(2) of the Companies Act No 71 of 
2008 provides that a company, a shareholder, director, company secretary or 
prescribed officer of a company, a registered trade union that represents 
employees of the company or another representative of the employees of a 
company may apply to a court for an order declaring a person delinquent or 
under probation. This power is also extended to the commission or the panel 
and any organ of state responsible for the administration of legislation.314 
This section applies where the person is a director of that company or within 
the 24 months immediately preceding the application, was a director of that 
company.315
 
  
3. Procedure 
The court must make an order declaring a person to be a delinquent director 
if the person:316
(a) consented to serve as a director or acted in the capacity of a director or 
prescribed officer, while ineligible or disqualified
 
317
                                                          
313D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 185. 
 unless, the person was 
314S 162(3) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; S 162(4) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
315S 162(2)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
316S 162(5) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
317S 162(5)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; Ineligible or disqualified in terms of s 69 of the  
Companies Act No 71 of 2008.  
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acting under the protection of a court order318 or as a director who owns all 
the shares or has the written consent of all the shareholders;319
(b) while under an order of probation in terms of this section or section 47 
of the Close Corporations Act, 1984 (Act No. 69 of 1984), acted as a director 
in a manner that contravened that order;
   
320
(c) while a director, grossly abused the position of director,
 
321 took 
personal advantage of information or an opportunity,322 intentionally or by 
gross negligence inflicted harm upon the company or a subsidiary of the 
company,323 acted in a manner that amounted to gross negligence, wilful 
misconduct or breach of trust in relation to the performance of the his 
functions;324 or acted in a manner contemplated in section 77(3)(a), (b) or (c) 
of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008;325
(d) has repeatedly been personally subject to a compliance notice or 
similar enforcement mechanism, for substantially similar conduct, in terms 
of any legislation;
 
326
(e) has at least twice been personally convicted of an offence, or subjected 
to an administrative fine or similar penalty, in terms of any legislation;
 
327
                                                          
318S 162(5)(a)(i)Companies Act No 71 of 2008; Protection of a court order as contemplated in 
S 69(11) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 or 
319S 162(5)(a)(ii)Companies Act No 71 of 2008; S 69(12) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
320S 162(5)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
321S 162(5)(c)(i)Companies Act No 71 of 2008; 
322S 162(5)(c)(ii)Companies Act No 71 of 2008; Took personal advantage of information or an 
opportunity contrary to s 76(2)(a) of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
323S 162(5)(c)(iii)Companies Act No 71 of 2008; contrary to section 76(2)(a) Companies Act 
No 71 of 2008. 
324S 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa)Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
325S 162(5)(c)(iv)(bb)Companies Act No 71 of 2008; A director of a company is liable for any 
loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a direct or indirect consequence of the 
director having: acted in the name of the company, signed anything on behalf of the 
company, or purported to bind the company or authorise the taking of any action by or on 
behalf of the company, despite knowing that he lacked the authority to do so; acquiesced in 
the carrying on of the company’s business despite knowing that it was being conducted in a 
manner prohibited by s 22(1)  of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008, or been a party to an act 
or omission by the company despite knowing that the act or omission was calculated to 
defraud a creditor, employee or shareholder of the company or had another fraudulent 
purpose. 
326S 162(5)(d) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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(f) within a period of five years, was a director of one or more companies 
or a managing member of one or more close corporations, or controlled or 
participated in the control of a juristic person, irrespective whether 
concurrently, sequentially or at unrelated times, that were convicted of an 
offence, or subjected to an administrative fine or similar penalty, in terms of 
any legislation.328
The person should also have been  a director of each such company, or 
a managing member of each such close corporation or was responsible for 
the management of each such juristic person, at the time of the contravention 
that resulted in the conviction, administrative fine or other penalty
  
329 and 
the court should be satisfied that the declaration of delinquency is justified, 
having regard to the nature of the contraventions, and the person’s conduct 
in relation to the management, business or property of any company, close 
corporation or juristic person at the time.330
Declarations of delinquency in terms of subsection (5)(a) or (b) are 
unconditional and subsists for a lifetime,
 
331 while those made in terms of the 
rest of the provisions may be made subject to any conditions the court 
considers appropriate,332 and subsist for seven years from the date of the 
order, or such longer period as determined by the court.333
A court may make an order placing a person under probation if while 
serving as a director, the person was present at a meeting and failed to vote 
against a resolution despite the inability of the company to satisfy the 
solvency and liquidity test,
  
334 acted in a manner materially inconsistent with 
the duties of a director335
                                                                                                                                                                                    
327S 162(5)(e) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 or acted in, or supported a decision of the company 
328S 162(5)(f) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
329S 162(5)(f)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
330S 162(5)(f)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
331S 162(6)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
332S 162(6)(b)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
333S 162(6)(b)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
334S 162(7)(a)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
335S 162(7)(a)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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to act in a manner that was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial.336 The court 
may declare a person under probation in the case of oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial conduct only if it is satisfied that it is justified having regard to 
the circumstances of the company’s or close corporation’s conduct, if 
applicable, and the person’s conduct in relation to the management, business 
or property of the company or close corporation at the time.337
An order for probation may also be made if within any period of 10 
years after the effective date the person has been a director of more than one 
company, or a managing member of more than one close corporation, 
irrespective whether concurrently, sequentially or at unrelated times
 
338 and 
during the time that the person was a director of each such company or 
managing member of each such close corporation, two or more of those 
companies or close corporations each failed to fully pay all of its creditors or 
meet all of its obligations,339 except in the case of a business rescue plan340 
and a compromise with creditors.341
The court may declare a person under probation in the these 
circumstances if the manner in which the company or close corporation was 
managed was wholly or partly responsible for it failing to meet its 
obligations
  
342 and the declaration is justified, having regard to the 
circumstances of the company’s or close corporation’s failure, and the 
person’s conduct in relation to the management, business or property of the 
company or close corporation at the time.343
                                                          
336S 162(7)(a)(iii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 A declaration placing a person 
under probation may be made subject to any conditions the court considers 
appropriate, including conditions limiting the application of the declaration 
337S 162(8)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
338S 162(7)(b)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
339S 162(7)(b)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
340S 162(7)(b)(ii)(aa) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; Business rescue plan resulting from a 
resolution of the board in terms of s 129 of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
341S 162(7)(b)(ii)(bb) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; Creditors in terms of s 155 of the 
Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
342S 162(8)(b)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
343S 162(8)(b)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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to one or more particular categories of companies344 and subsists for a period 
not exceeding five years.345
The court may order, as conditions applicable or ancillary to a 
declaration of delinquency or probation, that the person concerned to 
undertake a designated programme of remedial education relevant to the 
nature of the person’s conduct as director;
 
346 carry out a designated 
programme of community service347 or pay compensation to any person 
adversely affected by the person’s conduct as a director.348 In the case of an 
order of probation, an order may be also be made that, he be supervised by a 
mentor in any future participation as a director while the order remains in 
force,349 or be limited to serving as a director of a private company, or of a 
company of which he is the sole shareholder.350
A person who has been declared delinquent,
 
351 or is subject to an order 
of probation, may apply to a court to suspend the order of delinquency, and 
substitute an order of probation, with or without conditions, at any time 
more than three years after the order of delinquency was made.352 He may 
also make an application to set aside an order of delinquency at any time 
more than two years after it was suspended353 or of probation, at any time 
more than two years after it was made.354
On considering this application the court may not grant the order 
applied for unless the applicant has satisfied any conditions that were 
 
                                                          
344S 162(9)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
345S 162(9)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
346S 162(10)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
347S 162(10)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
348S 162(10)(c) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
349S 162(10)(d)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
350S 162(10)(d)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
351Declaration of delinquency other than as contemplated in s (6)(a) of the Companies Act 
No 71 of 2008 
352S 162(11)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
353S 162(11)(b)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
354S 162(11)(b)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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attached to the original order.355 An order may be granted if, having regard 
to the circumstances leading to the original order, and the conduct of the 
applicant in the ensuing period, the court is satisfied that the applicant has 
demonstrated satisfactory progress towards rehabilitation,356 and there is a 
reasonable prospect that the applicant would be able to serve successfully as 
a director of a company in the future.357 The commissioner must be served 
with a copy of the application.358
 
  
4. Conclusion 
The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 introduces provisions that provide 
remedies against directors who have blatantly abused their positions 
empowering the minority shareholder to disqualify these directors from 
serving as directors through a declaration of delinquency or placing them 
under probation. This remedy is not only open to the minority shareholder 
but to a host of other people who have an interest in the affairs of the 
company. It has the effect of preventing historically bad directors from 
continuing to act in that capacity. The new act also enhances director 
competence by providing for mentorship’s for those on probation and 
providing for remedial education for the directors who are either delinquent 
or on probation.  
                                                          
355S 162(12)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
356S 162(12)(b)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
357S 162(12)(b)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
358S 162(13) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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D. APPLICATION TO PROTECT RIGHTS OF SECURITIES HOLDERS 
1. The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 
The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 introduces the right of a shareholder to 
make an application to protect his rights.  
A holder of issued securities of a company may apply to a court for an 
order determining any rights of that person in terms of the act, the 
company’s memorandum of incorporation, the rules of the company and 
any applicable debt instrument.359An application may be made for 
appropriate orders, necessary to protect the rights contemplated.360 It could 
also rectify any harm done to the securities holder by the company as a 
consequence of an act or omission that contravened, the act or the 
company’s memorandum of incorporation, rules, applicable debt 
instrument, violated any right361 and directors to the extent that they may be 
held liable.362This right is in addition to any other remedy available in terms 
of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008 and common law.363
This provision in effect increases the avenues available to the minority 
shareholder in the protection of his interests. 
 
 
E. JUST AND EQUITABLE WINDING UP 
A company may be wound up by the court if the court is of the opinion that 
it is just and equitable that the company be wound up.364
                                                          
359S 161(1)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 This is a remedy 
which comes from partnership law and is particularly useful to the 
minorities of small companies which can often be regarded as glorified 
360S 161(1)(b)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
361S 161(1)(b)(ii)(aa) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
362S 161(1)(b)(ii)(bb) Companies Act No 71 of 2008; The liability of directors in terms of s 77 
of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
363S 161(2) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
364S 344(h) Companies Act No 61 of 1973; S 81(1)(d)(iii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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partnerships.365  Under the Companies Act No 71 of 2008 a shareholder may 
not apply to a court for just and equitable winding up unless he has been a 
shareholder continuously for at least six months immediately before the date 
of the application;366 became a shareholder as a result of acquiring another 
shareholder;367 or the distribution of the estate of a former shareholder.368
                                                          
365Hendrick Prins The Protection of the Minority Shareholders in a Limited Company at English, 
South African and Dutch Law (1943) 86. 
 
366S 81(2)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
367S 81(2)(b)(i) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
368S 81(2)(b)(ii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A. MINORITY SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
1. Protection from unfair prejudice in the United Kingdom 
A member of a company in The United Kingdom may apply to the court by 
petition for an order on the ground that the company’s affairs are being or 
have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests 
of members generally or of some part of its members, including at least 
himself369 or that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company is or 
would be prejudicial.370
A petition for an order on the ground that the company’s affairs are 
being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of members may also be initiated by the Secretary of State. This 
may occur where: 
 
(a)the Secretary of State has received an investigators report under section 
437 of the Companies Act 1985;371
(b) the Secretary of State has exercised his powers to require documents 
and information or to enter and search premises under section 447 or 448 of 
the Companies Act 1985;
  
372
(c) the Secretary of State or the Financial Services Authority has exercised his 
or its powers of information gathering and investigations under Part 11 of 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000;
  
373
(d) the Secretary of State has received a report from an investigator 
appointed by him or the Financial Services Authority under Part 11 of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
 or 
374
                                                          
369S 994(1)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
 
370S 994(1)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
371Chapter 6; S 995(1)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
372Chapter 6; S 995(1)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
373Chapter 8; S 995(1)(c) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
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If it appears to the Secretary of State that the company’s affairs are 
being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of members generally or of some part of its members,375 or an actual 
or proposed act or omission of the company is or would be prejudicial,376 he 
may apply to the court by petition for an order to prevent unfair 
prejudice.377 This may be done in addition to, or instead of presenting a 
petition for the winding up of the company.378
If the court is satisfied that a petition is well founded, it may make such 
order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained 
of.
 
379
(a)    regulate the conduct of the company’s affairs in the future;
 The court’s order may:- 
380
(b) require the company to refrain from doing or continuing an act 
complained of, or do an act that the petitioner has complained it has omitted 
to do;
 
381
(c)     authorise civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of 
the company by such person or persons and on such terms as the court may 
direct;
 
382
(d) require the company not to make any, or any specified, alterations in its 
articles without the leave of the court;
 
383
                                                                                                                                                                                    
374Chapter 8; S 995(1)(d) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
 
375S 995(2)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
376S 995(2)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
377S 995(2) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
378S 995(3) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
379S 996(1) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
380S 996(2)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
381S 996(2)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
382S 996(2)(c) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
383S 996(2)(d) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
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(e)    provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company 
by other members or by the company itself and, in the case of a purchase by 
the company itself, the reduction of the company’s capital accordingly.384
 
 
a. Conclusion 
The new South African companies act385 is similar to the United Kingdom 
companies act386 in the circumstances where one may be protected from 
unfair prejudice or oppressive treatment. Under Section 163 of the 
Companies Act No 71 of 2009, a shareholder or a director of a company may 
apply to a court for relief if any act or omission of the company, or a related 
person, has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that 
unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant.387
The Acts however have their differences; firstly, the Companies Act No 
71 of 2008 extends this relief to both members and directors
 
388 while the 
United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006389 only provides this remedy for 
members. Secondly, in the United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006,390 this 
remedy may also be exercised by the Secretary of State, while in the 
Companies Act No 71 of 2008 this is not the case. Finally, the Companies Act 
no 71 of 2008 seems to have a more comprehensive description of the type of 
relief which the court may give in comparison to the United Kingdom 
Companies of 2006.391
The Companies Act no 71 of 2008 is mostly at par with the United 
Kingdom Companies Act of 2006
 
392
                                                          
384S 996(2)(e) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
 and in some instances perhaps even 
385S 163(1) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
386S 995(1) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
387S 163(1)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
388S 163(1) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
389Chapter 46. 
390Chapter 46. 
391Chapter 46. 
392Chapter 46. 
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offers better protection to minority shareholders as far as protection from 
oppression and unfair prejudice is concerned. A possible recommendation 
would be to include a role to be played by the government similar to that 
played by the Secretary of State in the prevention of unfair prejudice.  
 
2. Derivative Action in the United Kingdom 
a. Introduction 
The Companies Act of 2006 eliminates the common law derivative action as 
elaborated in the rule in Foss v Harbottle,393 for a statutory derivative 
action.394
The cause of action may be against the director, another person or 
both.
 A derivative claim in the United Kingdom may be brought only in 
respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed acts or 
omissions involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by 
a director of the company.  
395 It is immaterial whether the cause of action arose before or after the 
person seeking to bring or continue the derivative claim became a member 
of the company.396 A director includes a former director, a shadow director 
and references to a member of a company include a person who is not a 
member but to whom shares in the company have been transferred or 
transmitted by operation of law.397 A shareholder or director responsible for 
the negligent act is not allowed to vote at a meeting of members called to 
ratify the act or omission.398
 
 
 
                                                          
393[1843] 2 Hare 461 
394Paul Davies and Jonathan Rickford ‘An Introduction to the New UK Companies Act’ 
European Company and Financial Law Review 2008 (5) 48 at page 71. 
395S 260(3) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
396S 260(4) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
397S 260(5) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
398S 239 Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
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b. Procedure 
A member of a company who brings a derivative claim must apply to the 
court for permission to continue it.399 If it appears to the court that the 
application and the evidence filed by the applicant in support of it do not 
disclose a prima facie case for giving permission, the court must dismiss the 
application400 and may make any consequential order it considers 
appropriate.401 If the application is not dismissed the court may give 
directions as to the evidence to be provided by the company,402 and may 
adjourn the proceedings to enable the evidence to be obtained.403 On hearing 
the application, the court may give permission to continue the claim on such 
terms as it thinks fit,404 refuse permission and dismiss the claim,405 or 
adjourn the proceedings on the application and give such directions as it 
thinks fit.406
A derivative claim can also occur where a company has brought a 
claim, and the cause of action on which the claim is based could be pursued 
as a derivative claim.
 
407 A member of the company, may apply to the court 
for permission to continue the claim as a derivative claim on the ground that 
the manner in which the company commenced or continued the claim 
amounts to an abuse of the process of the court;408 the company has failed to 
prosecute the claim diligently;409 and it is appropriate for the member to 
continue the claim as a derivative claim.410
                                                          
399S 261(1) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
 If it appears to the court that the 
application and the evidence filed by the applicant in support of it do not 
disclose a prima facie case for giving permission, the court must dismiss the 
400S 261(2)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
401S 261(2)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
402S 261(3)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
403S 261(3)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
404S 261(4)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
405S 261(4)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
406S 261(4)(c) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
407S 262(1) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
408S 262(2)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
409S 262(2)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
410S 262(2)(c) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
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application,411 and may make any consequential order it considers 
appropriate.412 If the application is not dismissed the court may give 
directions as to the evidence to be provided by the company,413 and may 
adjourn the proceedings to enable the evidence to be obtained.414 On hearing 
the application, the court may give permission to continue the claim as a 
derivative claim on such terms as it thinks fit,415 refuse permission and 
dismiss the application,416 or adjourn the proceedings on the application and 
give such directions as it thinks fit.417
Permission must be refused if the court is satisfied that a person would 
not seek to continue the claim.
 
418 It will also be refused where the cause of 
action arises from an act or omission that is yet to occur; that act or omission 
has been authorised by the company;419 and where the cause of action arises 
from an act or omission that has already occurred, which act or omission 
was authorised by the company before it occurred,420 or has been ratified by 
the company since it occurred.421
In considering whether to give permission the court must take into 
account: 
 
(a)whether the member is acting in good faith in seeking to continue the 
claim;422
(b) the importance that a person, acting with a duty to promote the success 
of the company, would attach to continuing it;
 
423
                                                          
411S 262(3)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
 
412S 262(3)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
413S 262(4)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
414S 262(4)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
415S 262(5)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
416S 262(5)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
417S 262(5)(c) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
418S 263(2)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
419S 263(2)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
420S 263(2)(c)(i) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
421S 263(2)(c)(ii) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
422S 263(3)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
423S 263(3)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
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(c) where the cause of action results from an act or omission that is yet to 
occur, whether the act or omission could be, and in the circumstances would 
be likely to be authorised by the company before it occurs, or ratified by the 
company after it occurs;424
(d) where the cause of action arises from an act or omission that has 
already occurred, whether the act or omission could be, and in the 
circumstances would be likely to be ratified by the company;
 
425
(e) whether the company has decided not to pursue the claim;
 
426
(f) whether the act or omission in respect of which the claim is brought gives 
rise to a cause of action that the member could pursue in his own right 
rather than on behalf of the company.
 and 
427
  In considering whether to give permission the court shall have 
particular regard to any evidence before it as to the views of members of the 
company who have no personal interest, direct or indirect in the matter.
 
428 
The Secretary of State may make amendments so as to alter or add to the 
circumstances in which permission may be refused or matters that the court 
is required to take into account in considering whether to give permission.429
Another member of the company may also apply to the court for 
permission to continue the claim.
 
430 It may be done on the grounds that: the 
manner in which the proceedings have been commenced or continued 
amounts to an abuse of the court process;431 the claimant has failed to 
prosecute the claim diligently;432
                                                          
424S 263(3)(c) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
 or it is appropriate for the applicant to 
425S 263(3)(d) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
426S 263(3)(e) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
427S 263(3)(f) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
428S 263(4) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
429S 263(5) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
430S 264(2) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
431S 262(2)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
432S 264(2)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
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continue the claim as a derivative claim.433 If it appears to the court that the 
application and the evidence filed by the applicant in support of it do not 
disclose a prima facie case, the court must dismiss the application,434 and may 
make any consequential order it considers appropriate.435 If the application 
is not dismissed, the court may give directions as to the evidence to be 
provided by the company,436 and may adjourn the proceedings to enable the 
evidence to be obtained.437 On hearing the application, the court may give 
permission to continue the claim on such terms as it thinks fit,438 refuse 
permission and dismiss the application,439 or adjourn the proceedings on the 
application and give such directions as it thinks fit.440
 
 
c. Conclusion 
This is a statutory derivative action which is wider that than the common 
law derivative action. The novelty of the general statutory derivative claim, 
contained in Part 11 of the Act,441 is that it places the decision about whether 
it is in the interests of the company for litigation to be commenced in any 
particular case in the hands of the court.442
                                                          
433S 264(2)(c) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
 The advantages of this new 
procedure is that on one hand, the individual shareholder can easily obtain a 
decision on the central question on whether it is in the interests of the 
company for the litigation to be brought, whilst, on the other hand, the 
individual shareholder’s enthusiasm for derivative litigation is subject to the 
filter of a judge having to be convinced that the litigation on behalf of the 
434S 264(3)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
435S 264(3)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
436S 264(4)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
437S 264(4)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
438S 264(5)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
439S 264(5)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
440S 264(5)(c) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
441Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
442Paul Davies and Jonathan Rickford ‘An Introduction to the New UK Companies Act’ 
European Company and Financial Law Review 2008 (5) 48 at page 71; S 261 (1) Companies Act 
2006 Chapter 46. 
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company is desirable.443
 Section 165 of Companies Act No 71 of 2008 provides that the 
derivative action may be used to protect the legal interests of the company, 
while a derivative claim in the United Kingdom may be brought only in 
respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed acts or 
omissions involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by 
a director of the company. The definition in the South African act is therefore 
not restricted and is open to a wider interpretation that the United Kingdom 
Act. The reason for the wider application it could be argued was to make 
provision for the type of cases that would have fallen outside the ambit of 
section 266 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 but still within the ambit of the 
common law derivative action.
 This act is similar to the South African Companies 
Act No 71 of 2008 in that they both do away with the common law 
derivative action in favour of a statutory one.  
444
 The derivative action in the United Kingdom is only available to the 
members of the company
 
445 while the derivative action under section 165 of 
Companies Act No 71 of 2008 is available to shareholders, directors and 
officers of the company, trade unions representing employees and any other 
person granted leave by the court.446
                                                          
443Paul Davies and Jonathan Rickford ‘An Introduction to the New UK Companies Act’ 
European Company and Financial Law Review 2008 (5) 48 at page 71. 
 In this respect, the derivative action in 
South Africa provides for wider range of people to take related steps, to 
protect the interests of the company.  
444Lindi Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act 
and the new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished 
Journal Article 13.  
445S 112 of the Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46, states that, the subscribers of a company’s 
memorandum are deemed to have agreed to become members of the company and on its 
registration become members. It further states that every other person who agrees to 
become a member of a company, and whose name is entered in its register of members, is a 
member of the company. 
446S 165(2) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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The procedure for a derivative action in the United Kingdom and 
South Africa are similar to the extent that in the United Kingdom the 
permission of the court is necessary before the action is commenced while in 
South Africa, a company that has been served with a demand for a 
derivative action under the Companies Act 71 of 2008, may apply within 15 
business days to a court to set aside the demand, only on the grounds that it 
is frivolous, vexatious or without merit.447 In the United Kingdom 
permission must be refused if the court is satisfied that a person would not 
seek to continue the claim;448 where the cause of action arises from an act or 
omission that is yet to occur; that act or omission has been authorised by the 
company;449 and where the cause of action arises from an act or omission 
that has already occurred, which act or omission was authorised by the 
company before it occurred,450 or has been ratified by the company since it 
occurred.451
The South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides for 
remuneration and expenses of the independent and impartial person or 
committee who investigate and report to the board
 The effect is that the South African derivative action is more 
accessible since it can only be denied on the three grounds of being 
frivolous, vexatious or without merit. 
452 any facts or 
circumstances that may gave rise to a cause of action.453The court may also at 
any time, make an order it considers appropriate about the costs 454of the 
person who applied for or was granted leave,455the company,456or any other 
party to the proceedings or application.457
                                                          
447S 165(3) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 In South Africa, if the 
448S 263(2)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
449S 263(2)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
450S 263(2)(c)(i) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
451S 263(2)(c)(ii) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
452S 165(4)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
453S 165(9)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
454S 165(10) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
455S 165(10)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008.  
456S 165(10)(b) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
457S 165(10)(c) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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shareholders of a company have ratified or approved any particular conduct 
of the company it does not prevent a person from making a demand, 
applying for leave, or bringing or intervening in proceedings with leave of 
the court unlike the United Kingdom.458
The derivative action in South Africa under the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 seems to be an improvement to that of the United Kingdom, in that 
above and beyond offering the power of the court to dismiss frivolous suits 
is also provides for costs and does not prevent a derivative action in cases 
where the act has been ratified.  
 
 
3. Just and Equitable Winding-Up 
S122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 grants power to the Court to wind up 
the company on just and equitable grounds. This is similar to the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 which also provides for just and equitable winding up.459
                                                          
458S 263(3) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
  
459S 81(1)(d)(iii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
66 
 
B. OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2004 
1. Introduction 
The OECD principles of corporate governance were endorsed by the 
convention on the organisation for economic co-operation and development 
(OECD) ministers in 1999 and have since then become an international 
benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders 
worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and 
provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both 
OECD and non OECD countries.460
Twenty countries originally signed the convention on the organisation 
for economic co-operation and development (OECD) on the 14th of 
December 1960; and since then a further ten countries have become 
members of the organisation. South Africa has not yet signed the 
convention.
  
461 The financial stability forum has designated the principles as 
one of the twelve key standards for sound financial systems. The principles 
also provide the basis for an extensive programme of cooperation between 
OECD and non-OECD countries and underpin the corporate governance 
component of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports 
on the observance of standards and codes (ROSC).462 The principles are a 
living instrument offering non-binding standards and good practices as well 
as guidance on implementation, which can be adapted to the specific 
circumstances of individual countries and regions.463
 
 
                                                          
460Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 4 Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  
[Accessed on 7th September 2009].  
461http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html 
[Accessed on 9th September 2009] 
462Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 3 Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  
[Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
463Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 4 Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  
[Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
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2. Minority shareholder protection under the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance 2004.   
The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
It states that the corporate governance framework should ensure the 
equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign 
shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain 
effective redress for violation of their rights.464 One of the ways in which 
shareholders can enforce their rights is to be able to initiate legal and 
administrative proceedings against management and board members.465 The 
confidence of minority investors is enhanced when the legal system provides 
mechanisms for minority shareholders to bring lawsuits when they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that their rights have been violated.466
The provision of such enforcement mechanisms is a key responsibility 
of legislators and regulators.
  
467 There is some risk that a legal system, which 
enables any investor to challenge corporate activity in the courts, can 
become prone to excessive litigation. Thus, many legal systems have 
introduced provisions to protect management and board members against 
litigation abuse.468
                                                          
464Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 4 Part one III Available at 
 In the end, a balance must be struck between allowing 
investors to seek remedies for infringement of ownership rights and 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
465Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 40 Part two III Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
466Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 40 Part two III Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
467Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 40 Part two III Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
468Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 40 Part two III Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
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avoiding excessive litigation.469 Many countries have found that alternative 
adjudication procedures are an efficient method for dispute settlement.470
In this regard all shareholders of the same series of a class should be 
treated equally
 
471 and within any series of a class, all shares should carry the 
same rights. All investors should be able to obtain information about the 
rights attached to all series and classes of shares before they purchase. Any 
changes in voting rights should be subject to approval by those classes of 
shares which are negatively affected.472
Minority shareholders should also be protected from abusive actions 
by, or in the interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or 
indirectly, and should have effective means of redress.
 
473  The potential for 
abuse is marked where the legal system allows, and the market accepts, 
controlling shareholders to exercise a level of control which does not 
correspond to the level of risk that they assume as owners through 
exploiting legal devices to separate ownership from control, such as pyramid 
structures or multiple voting rights.474
                                                          
469Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 41 Part two III Available at 
 In addition to disclosure, a key to 
protecting minority shareholders is a clearly articulated duty of loyalty by 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
470Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 41 Part two III Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
471Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 4 Part one III (A) Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
472Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 4 Part one III (A)(1) Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
473Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 4 Part one III (A)(2) Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
474Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 42 Part two III (A)(2)Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
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board members to the company and to all shareholders.475 Other common 
provisions to protect minority shareholders, which have proven effective, 
include pre-emptive rights in relation to share issues, qualified majorities for 
certain shareholder decisions and the possibility to use cumulative voting in 
electing members of the board.476 Under certain circumstances, some 
jurisdictions require or permit controlling shareholders to buy-out the 
remaining shareholders at a share-price that is established through an 
independent appraisal.477 Other means of improving minority shareholder 
rights include derivative and class action law suits.478
Other ways shareholders from the same class should be treated equally 
are that: votes should be cast by custodians or nominees in a manner agreed 
upon with the beneficial owner of the shares;
 
479 impediments to cross border 
voting should be eliminated;480 processes and procedures for general 
shareholder meetings should allow for equitable treatment of all 
shareholders; and company procedures should not make it unduly difficult 
or expensive to cast votes.481
 
 
                                                          
475Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 42 Part two III (A)(2)Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009].  
476Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 42 Part two III (A)(2)Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
477Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 42 Part two III (A)(2)Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
478Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 42 Part two III (A)(2)Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
479Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 4 Part one III (A)(3) Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
480Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 4 Part one III (A)(4) Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
481Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 4 Part one III (A)(5) Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
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3. Conclusion 
The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 as is seems to comply with most of the 
recommendations as proposed by the OECD principles of corporate 
governance. 
Firstly section 166(1)482
The OECD principles of corporate governance state that one of the 
ways in which shareholders can enforce their rights is to be able to initiate 
legal and administrative proceedings against management and board 
members.
 provides for alternative dispute resolution. It 
provides that as an alternative to applying for relief to a court, or filing a 
complaint with the commission a person who would be entitled to apply for 
relief, or file a complaint may refer a matter to the companies’ tribunal or an 
accredited entity, for resolution by mediation, conciliation or arbitration. The 
new act therefore provides a suitable avenue for alternative dispute 
resolution as envisioned in the OECD principles of corporate governance.  
483 It emphasises that the confidence of minority investors is 
enhanced when the legal system provides mechanisms for minority 
shareholders to bring lawsuits when they have reasonable grounds to 
believe that their rights have been violated. The Companies Act No 71 of 
2008 provides various ways in which shareholders can enforce their rights. It 
provides for: resolution of disputes concerning reservation or registration of 
company names;484 an application process to protect the rights of securities 
holders;485 an application process to declare a director delinquent or under 
probation;486 an application process for relief from oppressive or prejudicial 
conduct or from abuse of separate juristic personality of company;487
                                                          
482Act No 71 of 2008 
 a 
483Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 40 Part two III Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
484S 160 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
485S 161 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
486S 162 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
487S 163 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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procedure for dissenting shareholders’ appraisal rights488 and the derivative 
action, where the shareholder will allowed to bring an action that belongs to 
the company, where the company cannot or will not institute the action 
because the wrong doers control the company.489
The OECD highlights that, there is risk that a legal system, which 
enables any investor to challenge corporate activity in the courts, can 
become prone to excessive litigation. In this regard, the Companies Act No 
71 of 2008 provides for a way to prevent excessive litigation. Under the 
derivative action remedy, a person served under the section may apply to 
the court to set aside the demand on the grounds that it is frivolous, 
vexatious or without merit.
  
490
The OECD recommends that company procedures should not make it 
unduly difficult or expensive to cast votes. The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 
allows conduct of meetings by proxy, person or electronically so long as it 
does not infringe the memorandum of incorporation.
 It therefore appears that the Companies Act 
No 71 of 2008 provides some balance in that, it enables the minority 
shareholder to institute suits against the management and directors, while 
providing protection from excessive litigation.  
491 It however seems 
unclear whether one can exercise their right to vote electronically as section 
63(4)492 states that any person present and entitled to exercise voting rights 
must on a show of hands have only one vote, irrespective of the number of 
shares he or she holds or represents. It further states in section 63(5)493
                                                          
488S 164 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 that 
on a poll at any meeting of a company, any member including his or her 
proxy, must be entitled to exercise all the voting rights attached to the shares 
held or represented by that person. It is not clear whether presence includes 
electronic presence. 
489S 165 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
490S 165(3) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
491S 63(2) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
492Companies Act No 71 of 2008.  
493Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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The Companies Act No 71 of 2008  should be amended to include other 
provisions proposed by the OECD principles of corporate governance to 
protect minority shareholders which have proven effective such as, pre-
emptive rights in relation to share issues, qualified majorities for certain 
shareholder decisions and the possibility to use cumulative voting in 
electing members of the board. Investors should also be able to obtain 
information about the rights attached to all series and classes of shares 
before they purchase and changes in voting rights should be subject to 
approval by those classes of shares which are negatively affected.  
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C. KING REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR SOUTH 
AFRICA 2002 
1. Introduction 
The King committee on corporate governance was formed in 1992, under the 
auspices of the institute of directors, to consider corporate governance in the 
context of South Africa. The purpose of the report was to promote the 
highest standard of corporate governance in South Africa.494 The report 
highlighted the apparent lack of enforcement of existing remedies for breach 
of statutory and common law principles by delinquent directors and officers 
and recommended greater participation by the state in criminal remedies.495
 
 
2. Civil remedies under the King report 
Civil remedies are available to shareholders in that, contraventions of the 
provisions of the act often give rise to a delictual action or even personal 
liability. The exposure of directors and managers to such civil liability is an 
important regulatory and enforcement tool, which liability is seldom 
enforced. The main reason as per the report is that there appears to be a lack 
of access to the law on the part of the victim who are often holders of small 
parcels of shares in the relevant company.496 There is therefore no incentive 
for these small shareholders to resort to expensive litigation.497
                                                          
494King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 5. 
 The report 
argues that this deficiency should be cured in the following ways.  
495 King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 5. 
496 King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 157. 
497 King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 157. 
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a. Class Actions 
The report proposes the establishment in practice of more liberal use of class 
actions, but with appropriate provisions to prevent abuse.498 A class action 
enables a large number of claimants, whose claims are based on a well 
defined common question of fact or law, to have their matters heard in one 
proceeding. It avoids duplicity, thus ensuring economic and effective 
litigation.499 The court should be satisfied that there are a sufficient number 
of claimants to render the joinder of individual actions both impractical and 
unfair on the basis that they may lead to inconsistent results.500 This is 
referred to as certifying a class and once done, the named class plaintiffs and 
the attorneys assume fiduciary responsibility to protect the interest of the 
absent class members, who although not named, are bound by the outcome 
of the action.501 It is a common form of litigation in the United States of 
America and represents an exception to the general rule that one cannot be 
bound by a judgement rendered in a proceeding wherein one was not joined 
as a party.502 The liberal use of the class action can itself be a useful tool for 
providing better access to the law, particularly in the context of shareholders 
who are victims of management delinquency. The report concludes that, 
although the constitution provides for class actions, the rules of the court 
still need to be amended.503
 
 
                                                          
498King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 157. 
499King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 157. 
500King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 157. 
501King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 157. 
502King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 158. 
503King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 158. 
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b. Contingency Fees 
The use of contingency fees in the context of delinquency in the management 
of the company is another mechanism for promoting easier access to the 
law.504 A contingency fee is an agreement between a legal practitioner and a 
client to the effect that no fees will be charged if the case is conducted 
unsuccessfully.505 In March 1996, the South Africa Law Commission (SALC) 
published a working paper on speculative and contingency fees which led to 
the Contingency Fees Act506 which allows for contingency fee agreements 
with the exception of family and criminal matters.507 It proposed that 
contingency fee agreements be allowed with limitations on the fee relating to 
the prospects of success. SALC is of the opinion that the introduction of this 
will require an amendment to the existing law.508
 
    
c. Register of Delinquent Directors 
The report finally recommended amendment to the Companies Act509 to 
allow the disqualification of those persons who have been delinquent in the 
management of a company from being appointed as directors.510
                                                          
504King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 158. 
 
Consideration should be given to the formation of a register of directors to 
be maintained by the registrar of companies who are disqualified in any way 
505King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 158.  
506Act No 66 of 1997. 
507King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 158. 
508King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 158. 
509Act No. 61 of 1973. 
510King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 159. 
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from acting in that capacity.511 It is further recommended that organised 
business plays a more active role in ensuring that persons who have proved 
themselves unsuitable to manage companies are disqualified under the 
act.512
 
 
3. Shareholder activism under the King report. 
The inertia of shareholders and, more particularly, institutional shareholders 
is largely responsible for the non enforcement of the breach of duties by 
directors and managers.513 Shareholder activists in both the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America have had an impact on the behaviour of 
companies and other bodies.514 The report argues that similar bodies should 
be established and funded in South Africa.515
Shareholder activism will be encouraged through education and 
mechanisms which the rights of minority shareholders can be protected.
  
516 
An example is given of The United States of America where, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14a-8 makes recommendations for 
facilitating the submission of shareholder proposals at annual general 
meetings so long as the proponent has a minimum investment in the 
company and the proposal is relevant to the business of the company. 517
                                                          
511King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 159. 
It is 
argued that although representative bodies should try and educate the 
shareholder, the bulk of these shareholders are institutional investors and 
512King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 159. 
513King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 163.  
514King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 163.  
515King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 163. 
516King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 163. 
517King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 164. 
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focus should be shifted to their actions to protect the minority 
shareholder.518 In this regard corporate rating analysts should be 
encouraged to report on the qualitative aspects of companies. Factors such as 
business risk and corporate governance should be quantified.519
The report recommends that sanctions should also be visited upon 
directors and the management of the company, notably institutional 
shareholders who fail to attend shareholders’ meetings of companies of 
which they have invested.
  
520 The King report refers to the Myners Report on 
Institutional on Investment in the United Kingdom521 issued on 6th March 
2001, which recommends that directors and mangers of financial institutions 
such as insurance companies and trustees and managers of financial 
retirement funds who do not attend shareholders meetings of companies of 
which they have a prescribed level of investment should be censured.522 In 
the United States of America, the department of labour rules under the 
Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) states that a 
vote is a trust ‘asset’ and must be treated with the same level of care as the 
cash and other assets under management and by law or rule the fiduciaries 
should be required to vote and disclose how they voted.523
Finally the report argues that reputational agents play a critical role in 
ensuring good governance and thus better minority shareholder 
 
                                                          
518King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 163. 
519King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 163. 
520King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 164. 
521Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (the Myners Report) Available 
at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/1/6/31.pdf [Accessed on 9th September 2009]. 
522King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 164. 
523King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 164. 
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protection.524 These would typically include accountants, auditors, lawyers, 
corporate rating agencies, investment bankers, financial media, investment 
advisors, corporate governance analysts amongst others. These agents 
would play a part by not allowing their names or logos to be used in any 
transactions that do not deserve the sanctions of a respected reputational 
agent.525
 
  
4. Conclusion 
According to the King Report, the absence of shareholder activism in South 
Africa seriously undermines good levels of managerial compliance.526 
Institutional investors and pension funds remain passive for the most part 
despite some very obvious instances of poor and undesirable corporate 
governance practices by South African companies. A moderate level of 
activism has however emerged.527
Class actions, contingency fees and a register of delinquent directors 
have definite advantages as they are important tools in giving minority 
shareholders access to the courts.
 
528
                                                          
524King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 165. 
 The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 
complies with the recommendations of the King Report to certain extents. 
Under section 162 of the Companies Act no 71 of 2008, there is a provision 
for an application to declare a director delinquent or under probation. The 
court is empowered to disqualify these directors from serving as directors or 
place them under probation. On the recommendations of the King report, 
525King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 165. 
526King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 164. 
527King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 164. 
528King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 159. 
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the new act should be amended to provide specifically for class action suits 
and contingency fees to enhance minority shareholder protection.  
The act should be amended to establish bodies that encourage 
shareholder activism in order to prevent breaches of duty by directors and 
management that go unenforced. Shareholder education should also be 
specifically provided for in the new act introducing a report on qualitative 
aspects of companies such as corporate governance.  
As for mechanisms which the rights of minority shareholders can be 
protected, S61(3)(b) of the Companies Act no 71 of 2008, allows for 
shareholders with at least 10 percent of the voting rights to exercise them in 
relation a matter proposed to be considered at the meeting. 
The new act should also incorporate the part of the report that 
recommends sanctions be visited upon directors and the management of the 
company, notably institutional shareholders, who fail to attend 
shareholders’ meetings of companies of which they have invested. the vote 
should be considered a  trust ‘asset’ and treated with the same level of care 
as the cash and other assets under management and by law or rule the 
fiduciaries should be required to vote and disclose how they voted. Finally 
reputational agents should play their role in ensuring good governance and 
thus better minority shareholder protection by only endorsing companies 
with solid corporate governance practices.  U
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  NEW COMPANIES ACT NO 71OF 2008 VIZ A VIZ THE OLD 
COMPANIES ACT NO 61 OF 1973. 
1. Derivative action 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 revokes the common law derivative action. It 
further extends access of the derivative action to a broader category of 
person’s effectively increasing access to justice to other people that may be 
adversely affected by the actions of the wrongdoers in control.529
 Other differences are that, under Companies Act 61 of 1973, this action 
could only be instituted against a director or past director to recover damage 
suffered by the company as a result of wrongful acts, breach of faith and 
trust.
  
530 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 entitles a person to initiate 
proceedings to protect the legal rights of the company.531 This section does 
not specify the causes of action for which the derivative action is available 
and may be criticized as being too wide.532 It may well be that the member 
needs to get access to the company's records in order to determine whether 
or not an action should be instituted, but this is inaccessible to him.533 Rights 
of discovery prior to the initiation of litigation are therefore very important. 
Any amendments to the Act should introduce measures to remedy this 
disadvantage.534
                                                          
529S 165 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 
530S 266  Companies Act 61 of 1973 
531S 165 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
532Lindi Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act 
and the new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished 
Journal Article 23. 
533Darryl D. McDonough ‘Proposed new statutory derivative action -does it go far enough? 
(1996)8(1) Bond Law Review Article 3 45 at 51. 
534Arad Reisburg ‘Promoting the Use of Derivative Actions’ (2003) 24 (250) Company Lawyer 
Available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=502864 [Accessed on 13 August 2009]. 
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2. Unfairly prejudicial and oppressive conduct 
Under the Companies Act No 61 of 1973, this remedy was only available to 
members of the company while the Companies Act No 71 of 2008 extends 
this remedy to apply to both members and directors. The circumstances in 
which the remedy is available have been clearly and broadly defined. There 
is a more comprehensive description of the type of relief which the court 
may give compared to the old act. 
 With a view to providing effective relief, section 163(1) of the 
Companies Act No 71 of 2009, provides for the shareholder or director to 
approach the court by way of application. Where the application is opposed 
and there is conflicting evidence on affidavit which the court can only 
resolve with oral evidence, section 163(2) (k) of the Companies Act No 71 of 
2009, expressly empowers the court to make an order for the trial of any 
issue as determined by the court, where it cannot be decided by way of 
application proceedings.535
 
  
3. Dissenting Shareholders and Appraisal Rights 
The Companies Act No 71 of 2009 introduces an independent remedy for 
dissenting shareholders and provides an appraisal rights remedy. This 
seems to be in line with section 163,536
 
 whose purpose is to protect the 
minority shareholders against the actions of the majority shareholders rather 
that the actions of the directors. The circumstances in which the remedy is 
available have also been clearly and broadly defined with detailed 
procedural requirements that seem to ensure that the dissenting 
shareholder’s shares are fairly appraised.  
                                                          
535D Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa (2009) 192. 
536Companies Act No 71 of 2009. 
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4. Delinquency and Probation of directors 
The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 introduces provisions that provide 
remedies against directors who have blatantly abused their positions, 
empowering the minority shareholder to disqualify these directors from 
serving as directors through a declaration of delinquency or placing them 
under probation. This remedy is not only open to the minority shareholder 
but to other people who have an interest in the company. It prevents 
historically bad directors from continuing to act in that capacity. The new act 
further provides for mentorship’s and remedial education programmes for 
delinquent directors.   
 
5. Application to protect rights of securities holders 
The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 introduces the right of a shareholder to 
make an application to protect his rights.  A holder of issued securities of a 
company may apply to a court for an order determining any rights of that 
person in terms of the act, the company’s memorandum of incorporation, 
the rules of the company and any applicable debt instrument.537 This right is 
in addition to any other remedy available in terms of the Companies Act No 
71 of 2008 and common law.538
 
 This provision effectively increases the 
avenues available to the minority shareholder in the protection of his 
interests. 
6. Just and equitable winding up 
A company may be wound up by the court if the court is of the opinion that 
it is just and equitable that the company be wound up.539
                                                          
537S 161(1)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
  
538S 161(2) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
539S 344(h) Companies Act No 61 of 1973; S 81(1)(d)(iii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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B. THE NEW COMPANIES ACT NO 71OF 2008 VIZ A VIZ MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
1. Protection from unfair prejudice  
The new South African companies act540 is similar to the United Kingdom 
companies act541 in the circumstances where one may be protected from 
unfair prejudice or oppressive treatment. Under Section 163 of the 
Companies Act No 71 of 2009, a shareholder or a director of a company may 
apply to a court for relief if any act or omission of the company, or a related 
person, has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that 
unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant.542
 The Acts however have their differences; firstly, the Companies Act No 
71 of 2008 extends this relief to both members and directors,
 
543 while the 
United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006544 only provides this remedy for 
members. Secondly, in the United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006,545 this 
remedy may also be exercised by the Secretary of State, while in the 
Companies Act No 71 of 2008 this is not the case. Finally, the Companies Act 
no 71 of 2008 seems to have a more comprehensive description of the type of 
relief which the court may give in comparison to the United Kingdom 
Companies of 2006.546
 The Companies Act no 71 of 2008 is mostly at par with the United 
Kingdom Companies Act of 2006
 
547
                                                          
540S 163(1) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 and in some instances perhaps even 
offers better protection to minority shareholders as far as protection from 
oppression and unfair prejudice is concerned. A possible recommendation 
541S 995(1) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
542S 163(1)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
543S 163(1) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
544Chapter 46. 
545Chapter 46. 
546Chapter 46. 
547Chapter 46. 
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would be to include a role to be played by the government similar to that 
played by the Secretary of State in the prevention of unfair prejudice.  
 
2. Derivative Action  
In the UK there is a statutory derivative action which is wider that than the 
common law derivative action. The derivative claim, contained in Part 11 of 
the Act,548 places the decision about whether it is in the interests of the 
company for litigation to be commenced in any particular case in the hands 
of the court.549
 The advantage is that the individual shareholder can easily obtain a 
decision on the central question on whether it is in the interests of the 
company for the litigation to be brought. The action is subject to the filter of 
a judge having to be convinced that the litigation on behalf of the company 
is desirable.
  
550
 Section 165 of Companies Act No 71 of 2008 provides that the 
derivative action may be used to protect the legal interests of the company, 
while a derivative claim in the United Kingdom may be brought only in 
respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed acts or 
omissions involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by 
a director of the company. The definition in the South African act is therefore 
not restricted and is open to a wider interpretation that the United Kingdom 
Act. It is argued that the wider application would make a provision for the 
type of cases that would have fallen outside the ambit of section 266 of the 
 This act is similar to the South African Companies Act No 71 
of 2008 in that, they both do away with the common law derivative action in 
favour of a statutory one.  
                                                          
548Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
549Paul Davies and Jonathan Rickford ‘An Introduction to the New UK Companies Act’ 
European Company and Financial Law Review 2008 (5) 48 at page 71; S 261 (1) Companies Act 
2006 Chapter 46. 
550Paul Davies and Jonathan Rickford ‘An Introduction to the New UK Companies Act’ 
European Company and Financial Law Review 2008 (5) 48 at page 71. 
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Companies Act 61 of 1973 but still within the ambit of the common law 
derivative action.551
 The derivative action in the United Kingdom is only available to the 
members of the company
 
552 while the derivative action under section 165 of 
Companies Act No 71 of 2008 is available to shareholders, directors and 
officers of the company, trade unions representing employees and any other 
person granted leave by the court.553
 The procedure for a derivative action in the United Kingdom and 
South Africa are similar to the extent that in the United Kingdom the 
permission of the court is necessary before the action is commenced while in 
South Africa, a company that has been served with a demand for a 
derivative action under the Companies Act 71 of 2008, may apply within 15 
business days to a court to set aside the demand, only on the grounds that it 
is frivolous, vexatious or without merit.
 The derivative action in South Africa 
provides for wider range of people to take related steps, to protect the 
interests of the company.  
554
 In the United Kingdom, permission must be refused if the court is 
satisfied that a person would not seek to continue the claim;
  
555 where the 
cause of action arises from an act or omission that is yet to occur; that act or 
omission has been authorised by the company;556
                                                          
551Lindi Coetzee ‘Comparative analysis of the derivative litigation proceedings under the 1973 Act 
and the new Companies Act’ [2009] Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Unpublished 
Journal Article 13.  
 and where the cause of 
action arises from an act or omission that has already occurred, which act or 
552S 112 of the Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46, states that, the subscribers of a company’s 
memorandum are deemed to have agreed to become members of the company and on its 
registration become members. It further states that every other person who agrees to 
become a member of a company, and whose name is entered in its register of members, is a 
member of the company. 
553S 165(2) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
554S 165(3) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
555S 263(2)(a) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
556S 263(2)(b) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
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omission was authorised by the company before it occurred,557 or has been 
ratified by the company since it occurred.558
 The South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides for 
remuneration and expenses of the independent and impartial person or 
committee who investigate and report to the board
 The South African derivative 
action is more accessible since it can only be denied on the three grounds of 
being frivolous, vexatious or without merit. 
559 any facts or 
circumstances that may gave rise to a cause of action.560The court may also at 
make an order it considers appropriate about the costs 561of any person who 
applied for or was granted leave.562
 In South Africa, if the shareholders of a company have ratified or 
approved any particular conduct of the company it does not prevent a 
person from making a demand, applying for leave, or bringing or 
intervening in proceedings with leave of the court unlike the United 
Kingdom.
  
563
 The derivative action in South Africa under the Companies Act 71 of 
2008 seems to be an improvement to that of the United Kingdom, in that 
above and beyond offering the power of the court to dismiss frivolous suits 
is also provides for costs and does not prevent a derivative action in cases 
where the act has been ratified.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
557S 263(2)(c)(i) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
558S 263(2)(c)(ii) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
559S 165(4)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
560S 165(9)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
561S 165(10) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
562S 165(10)(a) Companies Act No 71 of 2008.  
563S 263(3) Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46. 
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3. Just and Equitable Winding-Up 
S122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 grants power to the Court to wind up 
the company on just and equitable grounds which is similar to the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008.564
 
  
C. OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 seems to comply with most of the 
recommendations as proposed by the OECD principles of corporate 
governance. Firstly, it provides a suitable avenue for alternative dispute 
resolution as envisioned in the OECD principles of corporate governance. 565
 The OECD principles of corporate governance state that one of the 
ways in which shareholders can enforce their rights is to be able to initiate 
legal and administrative proceedings against management and board 
members.
  
566 The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 provides various ways in 
which shareholders can enforce their rights. It provides for: resolution of 
disputes concerning reservation or registration of company names;567 an 
application process to protect the rights of securities holders;568 an 
application process to declare a director delinquent or under probation;569 an 
application process for relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct or from 
abuse of separate juristic personality of company;570 a procedure for 
dissenting shareholders’ appraisal rights571
                                                          
564S 81(1)(d)(iii) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
 and the derivative action, where 
the shareholder will allowed to bring an action that belongs to the company, 
565S 166(1) Companies Act No 71 of 2008 
566Organisation for economic co-operation and development ‘OECD principles of corporate 
governance 2004’ 40 Part two III Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf  [Accessed on 7th September 2009]. 
567S 160 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
568S 161 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
569S 162 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
570S 163 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
571S 164 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
88 
 
where the company cannot or will not institute the action because the wrong 
doers control the company.572
 The OECD highlights that, in some instances there could be a risk of 
excessive litigation to the detriment of the company. The Companies Act No 
71 of 2008 prevents excessive litigation by providing that a person served 
under the section may apply to the court to set aside the demand on the 
grounds that it is frivolous, vexatious or without merit.
  
573
 On the recommendations proposed by the OECD principles of 
corporate governance, the Companies Act No 71 of 2008 should be amended 
to include other provisions to protect minority shareholders which have 
proven effective such as, pre-emptive rights in relation to share issues, 
qualified majorities for certain shareholder decisions and the possibility to 
use cumulative voting in electing members of the board. Investors should 
also be able to obtain information about the rights attached to all series and 
classes of shares before they purchase and changes in voting rights should 
be subject to approval by those classes of shares which are negatively 
affected.  
  
 
D. KING REPORT 
According to the King Report, the absence of shareholder activism in South 
Africa seriously undermines good levels of managerial compliance.574 The 
report suggest that class actions, contingency fees and a register of 
delinquent directors have definite advantages as they are important tools in 
giving minority shareholders access to the courts.575
                                                          
572S 165 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
  
573S 165(3) Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
574King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 164. 
575King committee on corporate governance ‘King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa’ (2002) 159. 
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 The Companies Act No 71 of 2008 complies with the recommendations 
of the King Report to certain extents. Under section 162 of the Companies 
Act no 71 of 2008, there is a provision for an application to declare a director 
delinquent or under probation. The court is empowered to disqualify these 
directors from serving as directors or place them under probation. On the 
recommendations of the King report, the new act should be amended to 
provide specifically for class action suits and contingency fees to enhance 
minority shareholder protection.  
 The act should be amended to establish bodies that encourage 
shareholder activism in order to prevent breaches of duty by directors and 
management. Shareholder education should also be specifically provided for 
in the new act introducing a report on qualitative aspects of companies such 
as corporate governance. As for mechanisms which the rights of minority 
shareholders can be protected, S61(3)(b) of the Companies Act no 71 of 2008, 
allows for shareholders with at least 10 percent of the voting rights to 
exercise them in relation a matter proposed to be considered at the meeting. 
 The new act should also be amended to incorporate the part of the 
report that recommends sanctions be visited upon directors and the 
management of the company, notably institutional shareholders, who fail to 
attend shareholders’ meetings of companies of which they have invested. 
The vote should be considered a trust ‘asset’ and treated with the same level 
of care as cash and other assets and by law or rule the fiduciaries should be 
required to vote and disclose how they voted.  
 Finally reputational agents should play their role in ensuring good 
governance and thus better minority shareholder protection by only 
endorsing companies with solid corporate governance practices.  
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